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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICH~fOND 
Record No. 3543 
HENRY A. MENEFEE, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
COMlHONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
From the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, ;virginia. 
PETITION FOR "\VRIT OF ERROR .AND SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable J'ltstices of the Sttpreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: · 
Your petitioner, Henry A. J\tienefee, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by a certain sentence imposed upon him 
by the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, pro~ 
nounced on the 18th day of January, 1949, as the culmination 
of a criminal proceeding instituted against him by the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. 
Your petitioner herewith presents a transcript of the record 
in the said cause, duly certified. 
•I. MATER.IAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Henry A. :.Menefee was convicted of robbery in the Circuit 
Court of Pittsylvania .County, and sentenced to serve a 
term of ten years in the State penitentiary. The verdict re-
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suited largely from certain evidence given by the defendant's 
.divorced wife, as to facts which had transpired during cover-
tt;tre, the introduction of which was excepted to by counsel 
fpr the defense. Subsequent to the verdict and sentence which 
followed the admission of this evidence, the defendant moved 
the Court to set the verdict aside as contrary to the law and 
evidence. On the Court's having denied this motion, defend-
ant appli~s for this writ of error. . 
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The Trial Court permitted the Commonwealth to examine 
· the defendant's divorced. wife as to facts and events learned 
by that witness only by virtue of the marital relation, and 
ruled that the doctrine privileging· communications between 
husband and wife applies to audible and written statements 
·only. In so doing, it is respectfully submitted, the learned 
judge fell into error. 
2. Though moved by counsel so to do, the learned Trial 
Court refused to set the verdict aside as contrary to the law 
and the evidence, despite the fact that the jury in arriving 
at the verdict had heard evidence pi·esented by the defend-
ant's former wife concerning confidential facts learned only 
by virtue of the marriage relation. In denying this motion, 
it is respectfully submitted, the learned judge fell into error. 
~· •III. THE. QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
1. Does that doctrine of the Law of Evidence which treats 
as priv·ileged confidential co·m1nunications between husband 
and wife comprehend audible statentents only, or does it rather 
extend to all knowledge, ho'l.veve·r intparted, 'which the spo1t.~e 
leart/,8 during covert'ltre and solely by virtue of the marital 
relation 'I 
· ·IV. FACTS. 
Henry A. Menefee, a citizen of Franklin County, Virginia, 
.was indicted for robbery by violence, and subsequently tried 
in the Circuit. Court of Pittsylvania County. During the 
·course of the trial, and over the strenuous objections of coun-
sel for the accused, the attorney for the Commonwealth was 
permitted to examine the defendant's divorced wife, Mrs. Ocie 
Wade Menefee. The evidence given by ~Irs. ~fenefee·was in-
strumental in securing the defendant's conviction. It pur-
ported to establish that a certain firearm in the possession 
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of the Commonwealth was the propercy- of the defendant, ~ 
and that the latter brought it-home 'vith-hlm-on the night of 
the crime. It further purported to establish tl~e defendant 's-
absence from his home at the precise time of the crime, and 
subsequent visits by him to a spot where was found the safe 
which constituted the object of the robbery. This testimony 
of Mrs. 11:enefee was darnning; defendant \Yas found guilty, 
and his punishment :fixed at ten years' confinement in the 
State penitentiary. 
4* *Counsel for the defendant moved the Court to set 
the verdict aside as contrary to the la'v and the evi-
dence, which rnotion they supported by a brief with full cita-
tions of authorities. The Court, in denying the motion, set 
forth its reasons in an opinion which is part of the Record. 
The gist of the opinion is that the testimony given by Mrs. 
J\IIenefee did not concern ''privileged communications'', but 
only ''facts'' learned during coverture : 
''The wife had been granted an absolute divorce from the 
accused, and her testimony did not concern 'Privileged Com-
munications' as the term has been defined; she 'vas not per-
mitted to testify to any conversat·ion had with her husband 
concerning the robbery, but she was permitted to testify as to 
\vhat she saw and to facts that shelrnew of her o'vn knowledge; 
all of which came to her knowledge while the marriage sub-
sisted and the facts testified to by the wif~ were undoubtedly 
gained by virtue of the fact that the parties were, at the time, 
living together as man and wife." (Second page of "Memo-
randum of Opinion'' by the Trial Court; italics ours.) 
The Court's holding was not based only on legal grounds, 
however. The learned judge observed that marriage is a 
greatly \veakened institution, and submitted that the social 
interest in securing Henry ~{enefee 's conviction outweighed . 
the social interest in preserving the time-honored doctrine 
which bars testimony of a wife against her husband, or dis-
closure of confidential communications:· 
"One has only to read and see what is happening in this 
country to the sacred and solemn thing called marriage-
when the sovereign states of the nation are bidding against 
each other for the divorce market and even our own Com-
monwealth is relaxing its rules dealing with the subject of 
divorce. In the face of this should we adhere to rules, with-
out reason, which will permit a person guilty of a horrible 
crime to go unwhipped of justice?" (ld., eighth page.) 
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5 • *In adopting the view expressed in the opinion, the 
learned trial court denied counsel's motion to set aside 
the verdict as .contrary to the law and the evidence, and sen-
tenced Menef~e in accord with that verdict. · 
.·. 
V. ARGUMENT. 
1. Does that doctrine of the Law of Evidence which treats 
as privileged confidential communications between husband 
and wife cornprehend au,dible statements only, ot· does it rather 
extend to all knowledge, however im1Jarted, which the spouse 
learns during coverture and solely by virtue of the marital 
relation? 
Considerable benefit might attach to a preliminary discus-
sion and differentiation of the several rules pertinent to this 
inquiry, ·before a precise answer be framed to the above stated 
question. Now the Law of Evidence and the Law of Husband 
and Wife have'ndt in their areas of tangency produced a single 
rule, but rather have effected the creation of three separate 
doctrines to govern the testimony which may be given by those 
who are, or have been, in a marital relation. The first of 
these rules is the marital disqu,aUftcatio'l~ of either spouse to 
testify in the other's behalf. An early statement of this dis-
qualification is found in Coke on Littleton, 6b (1628): 
6411 *"It hath been resolved by the justices that a wife can-
not be produced ". * ... for * • II!< her husband, because they 
are two minds in one body.'' 
An early statement by the Virginia court on this incapacity 
of either spouse to testify for the other is in Johnston v. Slater? 
11 Gratt. 321 (1854): 
"From the· intimate relation between husband and wife; 
and from the strong bias and feeling towards each other, the 
law has provided that neither shall be a 'vitness in regard 
to. any subject in 'vhich the other is interested.'' 
The matter of disqualification of either spouse to testify in 
the other's behalf is treated in 2 Wigmore on Evidence, §600, 
et' seq. (3rd Ed., 1940). This eminent authority is careful to 
distinguish betw~en the disability of a spouse to testify for 
the other, and the .Privile .. qe of a spouse not to be testified 
against by the marital partner: 
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"In considering the reasons upon which the rule rests and 
the policy of altering it, the distinction must be kept in mind 
between the incapacity of the one spouse to testify for the 
other and the privilege not to testify ag·ainst the other. This 
distinction * * • warns us that we are here considering only 
the reasons for disqualifying them when voluntarily coming 
forward in favor of each other-reasons quite independent 
of those affecting the privilege of not being compellable or 
allowable to testify against each other.'' 2 Wigmore on Evi-
dence, §601. 
That this first rule, the common la'v disqualification of 
husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf, has no fur-
ther effect or validity in Virginia, is attested by Va. Code 
Ann., §6210 : 
7* *''Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to 
testify for or against each other in all cases, civil and 
crin1inal, except as otherwise provide.d. '' 
The second doctrine resulting from the interplay between 
the Law of Evidence and the Law of Husband and Wife, and 
by far the most famous, is the privilege accorded one in 1 a 
marital union not to be testified ag~inst by the other spouse. 
That this is a privilege rather than a disqualification, is clear 
fr0111 the authorities, and is manifest from the language of 
Va. Code .Am1.?: 
"In criminal cases hu,§.banrl and wife shall be allowed, 
and subject to the rules of evidence governing other witnesses, 
may be compelled to testify in b~half of each other, buf neither 
shall be compelled nor without the consent of the other, allowed 
to be called as a witness agQinst thg ethg:r e.x;gept in the case 
of a prosecution for an offense committed by one against 
the other, but if either be called and examined in ·any case as a 
witness in bel1alf of the other, the one so examined shall be 
deemed competent, aud subject to the exceptions stated in 
the next section, may be con1pelled to testify against the other, 
under the same rules and evidence governing other witnesses. 
The failure of either husband or wife to testify shall create no 
presun1ption against the accused, nor be the subject of any 
comn1ent before the court or the jury by the prosecuting attor-
ney. In the prosecution of a criminal offense committed by 
one against the other, each shall be a competent witness ex-
cept as to privileged communications.'' 
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That these first two rules must be sharply distinguished is 
again pointed out by Wigxnore (Vol. 8, · §2227) : 
"The history of the privilege not to testify against 
one's wife or husband is involved like .that of civil parties 
~ * • in a tantalizing obscurity. That it existed by the time 
of Lord Coke is plain enough; but of the precise time of its 
origin, as well as the *process of thought by which it 'vas 
s• reached, no certain record seen1s to have survived. What 
is a little odd is that it comes into sight about the same. 
time as the disqualification of husband and ,vife to testify' on 
one another's behalf(;: * * ; for the two have no necessary con-
nection in principle, and yet they travel together, associated 
in judicial phrasing, from almost the beginning of their re-
corded journey. 
"This much, however, may be fairly ass tuned, that the privi-
lege existed before the disqualification; for in 'vhat is ap-
parently the earliest explicit ruling, in 1580, the wife's testi-
mony on her husband's behalf is treated as receivable, while 
his privilege to keep her from testifying against him is ap-
parently. sanctioned. :i\ioreover the privilege is recognized 
more than once in the next half century; but there appears 
no ruling upon a wife's disqualification during that whole 
period, nor for some time thereafter.'' 
Now we approach the third joint rule of Evidence and the 
Law of Husband and \Vife-the ancient privilege of the com-
mon la,v, now embodied in Virginia statute, which interdicts 
disclosure of confidential communications between husband 
and wife. This privileg;c, and the privilege against adverse 
marital testimony, exhibit so many sin1ilar features that some 
confusion between them l1as been inevitable. The writers, how-
ever, are astute to point out that the two privileges are very 
diff~rent both in substance and in origin: 
"It is important at the outset of any discussion of rules re-
lating to competency of husband and wife as witnesses to allay 
confus~on by noting the inter-relation of the various rules. 
Once a g·eneral conception of the fact and mode of inter-rela-
tion is grasped, the general subject, save for the variations in 
statutes between jurisdictions, becon1es comparatively simple. 
*' * +:c (There is), first, the broad rule originating in the old 
common law conception that husband and wife are one in law, 
and that either, being a party to an action or interested tllere-
in, is incompetent for or against the other because their legal 
oneness makes the spouse not a party or interested, in fact a 
party or interested by legal fiction. * • • · 
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9* "" Secot.tdly, 've have the rule that neither spouse shall 
be pern1itted to testify again~ ±he 9ther with regard to 
confidentialQOD.lmunications. This rul~ is of separate origin. 
It rests upon nOteclmical addition to technical reasons, but 
upon a stronger basis of public policy than even the ·surviving 
reason for the first· rule. It seeks not alone to safeguard 
domestic harmony, but to make the marriage relation desir-
able and to permit and to keep inviolate those acts and con-
fidencies without which no two persons would wish to live in 
intimate and constant relation as man and wife. The rule is 
n1ore narrow than the first rule as to subject matter, since it 
safeguards only those acts and communications done or made 
by virtue of, or in the course of, marital relation, and in re-
liance on the privacy of .such relation. But it is more broad 
in that it protects 'matters 'lvith1-n its scope whether so-q.ght to 
be used for or against one of the spouses or for or against 
a third person, and whether information is sought during the 
existence of the relation or after its termination. This rule is 
.generally retained -in its full common law strength, save only 
for the co1nn1on law exceptions.'' 5 Jones on Evidence, §2128 
(2nd Ed., 1926; italics mine). 
''The Privilege for communications between husband and 
·wife is apparently, in time of origin, the second of such privi-
leges to be enforced at comrnon law, and yet the last to. be 
definitely recognized and distinguished. In the second half of 
the 1600s an instance of its application is found; and yet the 
explicit statement of 'the privilege, as a distinct one from any 
other rule, did not come in England until the statutory reforms 
of the Common Law Procedure Act, just as the second half of 
the 1800s ·was beginning. · 
"The explanation of the paradox is that until that time 
the present privilege for communications between husband and 
wife had not been plainly separated from the other privilege 
of husband or wife not to testify to any facts against the other. 
This latter privilege was fully established by the end of the 
1600s (ante, §2227). But among the various reasons advanced 
for its support was the policy of protecting domestic confi-
dence by p1:ohibiting their mutual disclosures (ante, §2228). 
In other 'vords, the true policy of the present privilege was 
perceived, and yet it was. not enforced in the shape of any 
rule distinct from the old established privilege of each not 
to testify against the other as a party or interested in the suit. 
That the twq are distinct is plain; for the privilege not to 
testify against the other is broader in the respect that it ex-
cludes testimony to any adverse facts even though they have 
been learned wholly apart from marital co~dence·, and is nar-
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rower in the respect that it applies only to testimony adverse 
to a party to the cause or to one in an equivale:Q.t position.'' 
8 Wigmore on Evidence, §2333 (3d Ed., 1940). 
10,.. *Counsel have· been, and will be, .at son1e pains to dif-
ferentiate the nature and incidents of the several mari-
tal rules of evidence, because it is submitted, with great re-
spect, that this differentiation was not n1ade by the learned 
judge in the trial below. ·For example, it has not even been 
contended, and counsel do not contend., that divorce does not 
terminate the privilege against adverse testimony by the 
other spouse~ 1nstead, it is generally recognized that for1ner 
husbands and wives may testify one against the otller once 
the marital relation has been tenninated: 
''Since the general rule of the common law here under dis-
cussion, that husband or wife is incon1petent to testify for 
or against the other was, in origin, but an outgrowth of the 
rule that parties and persons interested were incon1petent,. 
based on the legal oneness of husband and wife, it follows 
that when that oneness ceases to exist by the legal termina-
tion of the relation through death of one of the· parties or 
through absolute divorce, incon1petency under this rule is re-
nlo.ved and the rule no longer applies. After the close of the-
marriage relation, either· party may testify to 1natters which 
took place during the rnarriage, unless, under an entirely dif-
ferent rule such testin1ony involves disclosure of n1at.ters ot 
confidence.'' 5 Jones !ln Evidence, §2_136 (2nd Ed. 1926. ~ 
"* e * A divorced wife is competent to testify against bm· j 
former husband * * *. '' 3 \Vbarton on Criminal Evidence, 
§1190 (11th Ed. 1935.) 
''or; e * the general rule, except in a few jurisdictions, is J 
that a divorced spouse is a co1upetent witness against the · 
other f!.• ~" *.'' 58 An1. J ur ., §204. 
The marital privilege against disclosure of confidential 
communications is universally rec.ognized however, to sur-
vive divorce or other te1·miilation of the marriage relation: 
''One of the practical differences between then1 (the pri'\-~­
lege against adverse marital testimony and the privilege. fot· 
confidential <;on1municntion) is that the former applies only 
where the testimon¥ is adverse·, i. e., where the other spousn 
Henry A. Menefee v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 9 
is either a party or in an equivalent position., while the 
11 * latter may be invoked by any *spouse however indiffer-
ent to the cause. Another difference is that the former 
may cease with the death or divorce of the spouse against 
whom the testimony may be offered, while the latter is per-
petuaL Another and still more in1portant difference is that 
the forn1er prohibits the spouse's adverse testimony regard-
less of the source of knowledge, while the latter covers only 
knowledge obtained throug·h the confidence of the marriage 
relation. 
''The two privileges have ·practically nothing in common, 
either in policy or in rule; and their complete separation 
needs repeated emphasis before the possibility of confusion 
can be cleared away.'' 8 Wigmore on Evidence, §2334. 
''The incompetency of one of the spouses to testify as to 
confidential CQ@nunications n1ade by· the other while the 
marital relation existed IS not removed bv the termination of 
tl1e 1narital relation, such as by the death of one of the 
spouses, or by reason of a judgment granting a separation 
or divorce, and in some jurisdictions there are statutory pro-
visions to this effect. But a surviving or divorced husband 
or wife is, a confident witness against the former spouse as 
to matters occurring during marriage, knowledge of· which 
\vas not acquired by 1,·eason of their relation.'' 70 C. J., 
§531. ' 
"The admissibility of the confidential communication is 
not effected by the subsequent divorce or death of the parties; 
rH~ither death nor pern1anent separation by divorce releases 
them from· the obligation of secrecy imposed by marriage. 
That is, the same privilege continues after divorce or death, 
and neither of the parties can then reveal any information 
acquired during the nwrriage. '' 3 )Yha_rton on Criminal 
evidence, §1249. . 
"But even absolute divorce, thoug·h adequate to remove 
the general incon1petency of the comtuon law for one spouse 
to testify for or against the other, does .not remove incom-
petence to testify to con1munications between the spouses 
made during the confidence of the relation and during the 
time that such relation subsisted." 5 Jones on Evidence, 
·~2147. . . ~ --. 
This comn1on law rule has been embodied in Virginia stat-
ute for half a century: 
"Neither husband nor wife shall, without the consent of 
the other, be examined in any case as to any communication 
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privately made by one to the other while married, nor shall 
either be permitted, without such consent., to reveal in testi-
mony after the marriage relation closes any svcb gqm;Qn~ni­
cation made while the marriage subsjsted. '' Va. Code Ann. 
§62~2. {The statutory expression "communication privately 
made" imparts the san1e meaning as the common law term 
"'confidential communication". Thonws v. First National 
Bank of Danville, 166 Va. 497, 186 S. E. 77 (1936).) 
1.2• *With this backg-round, let us reexamine the facts in 
the case at bar. lienry Menefee was on trial for rob-
bery. His divorced wife was called as an adverse witness. 
Counsel had offered no objection to her competency as a wit-
ness for the prosecution in g·eneral, but had objected vigor-
ously to her being permitted to testify ~.s to any informati-eR 
v-~which she acTuired]Jx yirtne of hw-ma.14ta.l ... r-elation with the 
defendant.he contention was made that any knowledge ob-
tained by reason of the marriage relation, and which but for 
the confidence growing out of that relation, would not have 
been known, is a privileged communication. The Court over-
ruled this objection, holding that the doctrine of confidential 
communications includes onlv verbal and written informa-
tio~. Counsel duly excepted" to. the ruling, on the grounds 
above stated. 
In due course 1\frs. 1\fenefee was called to the stand. She 
identified her former husband's pistol. She testified that 
she saw it on the night on which the robbery was committed, 
on the ''wardrobe or the mantel in the kitchen". . 
·Mrs. Menefee next testified that it was her husband who 
placed the pistol on the n1antel, and in response to a direct 
question on that point, she related that· he came in between 
twelve and two that night. She was questioned as to his con-
dition, and replied that be was sober. She was further ques-
tioned as to his nervous state, and testified in response. She 
identified a "back" taken from a car, given her by the de-
fendant, her former ln;ts band, during marriage. She stated 
that he had that car on the night the robbery was committed. 
She then testified that her husband ~left borne that af-
13• ternoon ''around three o'clock,, I believe.'' The follow-
ing colloquy ensued between counsel for the Common-
wealth and Mrs. 1\ienefee. 
'' Q. And the next time you saw him was between twelve 
and twoY 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Is that when you saw him put the pistol on the ward-
robe when he came in that night? 
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''A. Yes, sir, I think so, just as he ·came in. 
'' Q. Mrs. Menefee, a short time after this, after May 24th, 
did you see him-state whether or not you saw him attempt-
ing to do.anything with the car, the back end·of the carY . 
•• 
. , 'Q. Did you see him do anything at all to the car 7 
"A. Yes, sir .. 
''Q. What did he doY 
''A. He was messing with the back. 
'' Q. What was he doing 7 
''Judge Whittle: Answer the question, if you can, witness. 
"A. I don't know what he di<l: to it, but he was messing..-
with the lid. .. . 
'' Q. You mean this part right here Y 
''A. Yes, sir. 
''Q. Do you know what he did-did he have any kind of 
instrument or anything? · 
"A. Y cs, sir. 
"Q. What? 
''A. A razor blade.'' 
She then testified that she had several times driven her 
husband, after the robbery, to the general_vicinity where . 
14* the stolen *safe was later found. Mrs. lreiiefee thus 
testified that her husband·left home at three o'clock on 
the afternoon of the robbery, that he took a ~~- whlcli-lhe 
prosecution identified with the robbery along with him, that 
he returned after midnight, that at that time he laid a cer-
tain weapon which the prosecution connected w\th the rob-
bery on the wardrobe or the manteJ in his kitclien, that he 
was then nmous, that shortly thereafter she saw him. using 
·a razor blade on the back of the car., and that she several 
times drove him to the vicinity- where the stolen safe was 
later found. The "razor blade testimony" was important 
in that from it the jury· could have drawn an inference that 
the defendant was attempting to remove certain pam.t...-par-
ticles imbedded in the back of his car allegedly as the result 
<>f the stolen safe's having ridden there. (The prosecution 
later introduced expert testimony which tended so to connect 
the safe and the defendant's car.) 
The testimony given by 1\{rs. Menefee was thus very com-
prehensive. There can be no dispute but that all of the in- · 
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formation it conveyed \vas derived by virtue of the marital 
relation. Indeed, the learned trial judge in his opinion,. 
states this to be a fact. (" Memqrandum of opinion", sec-
ond page. Quoted on pag·e 18, infra.) 
There is thus no question with reference to whether the 
facts and the events testified to bv ~Irs. ~Ienefee constituted 
knowledge l~arn-ed by virtue of the marital relation. As a 
matter of fact, no other 'contention could be voiced-but even 
if such were not the case, the trial judge has explicitly ruled 
that the matter testified to by ~Irs. l\tlenefee embraced in-
formation obtained by reason of the 1narriage relation_ 
15• The trial court so ruled, but still *permitted this evi-
dence to come in, taking· the view that the privilege for 
confidential communications includes ideas only which are 
transferred orally or by writing. 
Having heard the testimony of J\!Irs. 1\f.enefee, the jury 
found the defendant .guilty and fixed his punishment at ten 
years confinement in the state penitentiary. Counsel· for 
1\f.enefee 1noved the court to set the verdict aside as contrary 
to the law and evidence. In support of this motion counsel 
submitted a brief setting forth at some length the authori-
ties-from a perusal of which it could only be concluded that 
the court had permitted ~Irs. l\lenefee to testify as to con-
fidential communications. Counsel cited nun1erous authori-
ties establishing that the n1arital privilege against disclosure 
of confidential comn1unications survives the termination of 
that marriage, a1ld further cited Va. Code Ann. §6212 (Quoted 
supra). 
The learned trial court denied the motion to set aside the 
verdict. In so doing, the court handed down a written opin-
ion, which is a part of the record herein. It is submitted,. 
with great respect, that the opinion handed down by the 
learned judge reveals a 1nisundersta1~ding of the legal prin-
ciples pertinent to this case. Counsel were contending that 
1\{rs. 1\{enefee bad been permitted to divulge privileged COin-
munications. The learned judg·e did not discuss tliis ·issue,. 
but contented hiinself with a state1nent that "she was no~ per-
mitted to. testify to a conversation had with her husband con-
cerning the robbery", wbich indicated that the learned court 
considered that this disposed of the matter. This, of course,. 
was the only real issue., but it was not ag·ain Inentioned in the 
opinion, the rest of which was devoted to the question of 
16• whether or not divorce tern1inates the *general marital 
incompetency of one spouse to te$tify against the other . 
. As to this point, tbe learned judge's written ruling is· inter-
esting and informative-but, it is respectfully submitted, not 
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pertinent to the actual controversy. Counsel were not ·con-
tending that 1\tfrs. l\Ienefee was an in.co1npetent witness '(See 
Record, p. 10-A and the top of the fourth page of the learned 
.Judge's opinion). Tbe authorities which the trial court 
quotes, however, relate rrwrely to the termination after di-
vorce of the general rnarital incompetency of husband and 
wife to testify against each other, with reference to any mat-
ter. A very long passage is quoted by the learned judge 
frorn 8 '\Vigmore on Evidence, §2237. Counsel take no issue 
with these statements, but submit that they are not material. 
The issue before the court was whether or not l\1rs. Mene-
fee's testimony concerned confidential communication~-and 
if so, whether divorce terrninated that privilege. The learned 
trial court recognized tllat the privilege for confidential com-
munications was not tern1inated by divorce (fourth page of 
memorandum of opinion), but devoted the greater part- of 
his opinion to a discussion of the effect of divorce on an en-
tirely different rule of evidence-that which privileges ad-
verse marital testinrony in general. Counsel respectfully sub-
mit that the learned trial court confused the issues, and that 
iri so confusing the issues the pertinent law was misapplied. 
As a furtlier indication that the learned judge below failed 
to con1prehend the exact nature of the legal question pre-
sented, it should be noted that the following statement ap-
pears in his opinion: 
17* ., 'Professor vVigrnore 's -roasoning would hardly ap-
ply in the l\fead~~ase where the construction of this 
statute was involved, but in our opinion it very strongly ap--
plies in the instant case and it apparently recites the ma-
jority rule in this country. I-Iowever, there are text authori-
ties to the contrary. See Jones on Evidence, 4th Edition., 
1330; Sec. 736; Underhill on Evidence, 4th Edition, p. ·668, 
Sec. ·347,. and "\Vharton 's Criminal Evidence, lOth Edition 816, 
Sec. 399. None of these authorities discuss the matter as 
elaborately and as thoroughly as Professor Wigmore." 
The difficulty here is that these three authorities, Jones, 
TJnderhill and vVliartou, were in the places cited discussing 
the 1nanuer in which privileg·ed communications. survive 
tern1ination of the marital status. They were not "contrary" 
to the long· passage quoted from Wigmore at all. Wigmore 
. himself. agrees that the privilege for confidential communica-
tions endures after divorce. See 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 
§2341. ('' * * * the privilege does not terminate with di-
vorce.'') 
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Counsel for the defendant do . not" contend, and have not 
~ontended, that the general privilege against adverse marital 
testimony does not terminate with divorce. Similarly, it is 
. ~not expected that the Attorney General will contend that the 
~ntirely different privilege accorded confidential communica-
tions does not survive the n1arriage. In the face of Va. Code 
Ann. §6212, no such contention would be possible.) The only 
actual issue, then., is the legal propriety of the trial court's 
ruling· that the doctrine of privileged communications be-
tween husbaild and wife comprehends only those communica-
tions which are expressly written or· verbal. , · 
As has been previously affirmed, the learned judge below 
did not discuss this issue in his opinion. He appears to have 
assumed that the term '''privileged communications'' was of 
no greater latitude or scope than an oral conversation: 
1s• *''The wife had been granted an absolute divorce 
from the accused, and her testimony did not concern 
'Privileged Communications' as the term has been defined; 
she was not permitted to testify to any conversation ha:d 
with her husband .concerning the robbery, but she was per-
mitted to testify as to what she saw and as to facts that she 
knew of her own knowledge: all of which came to her l{nowl-
edge while the marriage subsisted and the facts testified to 
by the wife were undoubtedly gained by virtue of the fact 
that the parties were, at the time, living together as man and 
wife." (Second page of ":Nlemorandum of Opinion'' by the 
trial court.) 
Counsel will now attempt to demonstrate that in so hold-
ing, the learned trial judge. fell into error-that it is the 
universal rule that the con1mon la'v and statutory doctrine 
pA¥ileAed commuitieRHo~between husband and wife is not, 
on a:uthority, and should not be on principle; be limited to 
merely those communications wh~ch are v~xprru;sed. 
Such a view, if upheld, would emasculate the- docrrll1e ~of 
privileged communications. But the contention need be given 
no credence. It is ancient learning that the doctrine privi-
leging communications between husband and wife includes 
any information obtained by either during· the marriage and 
by reason of its existence-t]Jat it embraces all knowledge ob-
tained by virtue of the marital relation, and which, but for the 
· eon:fidence grQwing out of that relation, would not have been 
known. The attention of the Court is respectfully directed 
to the following cases, which uphold the truth of the fore-
going statement: 
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Owen v. State, 78 .Ala. 425., 56 Am. Rep. 40; Mercer v. State, 
40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154, 74 Am . .St. Rep. 135 (1898); Williams 
v. Phillips, 39 Ga. 597, 605 (1869); Jackson v. Jackso·n, 40 Ga. 
150, 153 (1869); lJfclntyre v. llleldrim.~ 40 Ga. 491 (1869); 
Davis v. Weaver, 46 Ga. 626 (1872) ; Goodrum v. State, · 
19* 60 Ga. 509 (1878); Stanford v. *M·ur11hy, 63 Ga. 411, 
416 (1879); Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 Ill. 368; 44 N. E. 
820 (18'96); Don'luuz v. Domzan, 236 Ill. 341, 86 N. E. 279 
(1908) ;. Schreffler v. Chase, 245 Ill. 395, 92 N. E. 272 (1910); 
Stephens v. Collison, 256 Ill. 238, 99 N. E. 914, Donnan v. 
Donnan, 256 Ill. 244, 99 N. E. 931 (1912); 1J1ahlstetlt v. Ideal 
L(qht·in.q Co., 271 Ill. 154, 82 A. L. R. 124; Castello v. Castello, 
41 Ga. 613; Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Com., 293 Ill. -4:61, 127 
N. E. 743; Casper National Bank v. Jenner, 268 Ill. 142, 108 
N. E. 998; Monagha'lt v. Green, 265 Ill. 233; 106 N. E. 792; 
TV etzel v. Firebaugh, 251 Ill. 190, 95 N. E. 1085; Abrahams 
v. Woolley, 243 Ill. 365, 90 N. E. 667; Pyle v. Oustatt, 92 Ill. 
209; Reeves v. Herr, 59 Ill. 81; Browing v. Spu.rrier, 245 Ill. 
A.pp. 276; Perry v. Randall, 83 Ind. 143; ·sexton v. Sexton, 
129 Iowa 487; 105 N. vV. 314, 2 L. R. A. N. S. 708; Le~~tcht v. 
Le'ltcht, 129 I<y. 700, 112 S. W .• 845; Allcock v. Allcock, 174 
J(y. 665, 192 S. W. 853; Willey v. Howell, 168 Ky. 466; 182 
S. W. 619; Hostetter v. Green, 159 l{y. 611, 167 S.· W. 919; 
lT' all's Ex'r. v. Dimn~itt, 132 Ky. 747; 117 S. W. 299; Corn-
monwealth v. 8azJp, 90 l(y. 580, 14 S. W. 834; Elswick v. Com-
monwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.) 155; Prudential Ins. Co. v. P·ierce's 
Adn~'x. (l{y.), 109 S. W. (2d) 616 (1938).; Todd v. Barbee, 
271 Ky. 381; 111 S. W. (2d) 104; Lavengood v. Lavengood 
(Ind.)~ 71 N. E. (2d) 626 (1947); Pierson v. Illinois C. R. Oo., 
159 Mich. 110, 123 N. ,V. 576 (19·27); People v. Gessinger, 
238 lVIich. 625, 215 N. "\V. 184; lJt cCague v. Miller, 36 ·ohio St. 
59; Dischner v. Disclvner, 16. Ohio App. 88; Cook v. Giange, 
18 Ohio 526 (1849); Dick v. Hyer," 94 Ohio 351, 114 N. E. 251 
(1916); TVh:itehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So·. 737, 62 So. 
432, 51 L. R. A. (N. S. 187 (1913); Cha1nberlain v. 
20• People, 23 N. Y. 85; 80 Am. Dec. 255; *State v. Jolly, 
20 N: C. 108, 32 Am. Dec. 656; Calvert v. 8tate, 158 
Tenn. 531, 14 S. W. (d) 735; McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 
218., 186 S. "\V. 85; TVashingtmvv. Bedford (Tenn.), 10 Lea 
243; Orr v. Coxe (Tenn.), 3 Lea 617; Patton v. Wilson 
(Tenn . .), 2 Lea 101; State v.- McAuley (Tenn.)) 4 Heisk. 424; 
J(itnbro'lt.Qh v. Mitchell (Tenn.), 1 IIead 539; Bru,qh v. Fer-
,Quson (Tenn.), 11 Humphr. 565; Re Ford, 70 Utah 456, 261 
Pac. 15 ;Lankan~ v. Lanham,, 105 Tex. 191; 145 S. W. 336; 
Niles v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 447, 484 S. W. 568; 1J!cFadden 
v. Welch (1\tiiss.), 170 So. 903; Boykin, v. Boykin, 70 N.C. 262, 
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1.6 Am. Rep. 776; Hansel'I1Wn v: Dovel, 102 Mich. 505; 47 
Amer. St. Rep. 557, 60 N. W. 678; TVickes v. Walden-, 228 IlL 
56., 81 N. E. 798; Hertrich v. Hertrich, 114 Iowa 643, 89 Am .. 
St. Rep. 389, 87 N. W. 689; State v. Kodat (1\'Io.), 51 L. R. Ap 
. 509. 
Before considering the individual languag·e of these cases,. 
which constitute the great weight of American authority, it 
might be helpful to .. consider the views of the various sec-
ondary authorities· 'vho have examined this subject: 
"The term 'co~tion' within the meaning of tl1e 
privileged communication rule, as to husband and wife, should 
be given a liberal construction and is not confined to mere 
audible communications or conversations between the spouses, 
but·~embraces all facts which have co1ne to his or· hei_knowl-
edge or under his or her observation in consequence or by 
reason of the confidence of the marital relation, and which 
hut for the confidence growing out of it would not have been 
known. It includes knowledge comtnunicated by an act,. 
which would not have been done by one spouse in the pres-
. ence of, or within the sight of, the other, but for the confi-
dence between then1 by reaf?on of the marital relation, or in-
formation acquired by one spouse from the other by such 
relatione* ~." 70 C. J. §520 (1935). 
"* * * the privile~·ed con1munication rule excludes testi-
mony of communications as to n1atters of a confidential na-
ture, arising out of the marital relation, or as· to any· 
21 * fact or *transaction, knowledge of which was obtained 
by means or in consequence of the marriage relation 
• Ill*." 70 c. J., §512 (1935). . 
"The matter which the law prohibits either the huslmnd or 
wife from testifying to as a witness includes any information 
obtained by 'either during the marriage and by reason of its: 
existence. It is not confined to mere staten1ent~ by one to 
the other, but embraces all knowledge on the part of either 
obtained by reason of the marriag·e relatiori., and \vhich, but 
for the confidence growing- out of such relation would not 
have been known.'' 5 Jones on Evidence, §2143 (2nd Ed. 
1926). 
''Undoubtedly confidential communications may consist of 
acts as well as words." I d., §2144. 
''To be privileged, the subject of t.be. comn1unica tion must 
be one that would not have been disclosed except for the 
marital relation, us privilege extends only to confidential 
communications, and does not cover topics incident to g·eneral 
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intercourse or facts which came to the knowledge of the tes-
tifying spouse by mea -;_1s equally accessible to persons not 
standing in the marital relation. 
* * 
''The privilege is not always confined to mere audible com-
munications, but includes knowledge communicated by acts 
which w<;>uld not have occurred in the others presence but 
for the marital· confidence, and covers admissions by silence 
as well as· admissions by words.' ~3 vVharton pn Criminal 
Evidence, §1250 (11th Ed. 1935). · ~ 
In this chorus of opinion by the secondary authorities 
showing that the marital privilege for confidential communi-
cations is in no way limited to those communications which 
are audible or written, but one solitary voice is raised in op-
position. The one dissenter is the perennial rebel, the late 
Dean ':Vigmore, unquestionably one of the great legal scliolars 
of our time-but equally unquestionably, a writer whose 
opinions of what should be the law frequently conflict with 
what ·the law actually is.. The following statement is Wig-
more's position: 
22* *''The privilege has as its object the security from 
apprehension of disclosure,-a security in col}sequence 
of which confidences will be freely ·given and not withheld. 
The protection therefo·re extends only to comn1unications, i.e., 
utterances, not acts-the reasoning being· analogous to that 
which establishes a sirnilar limitation for communications be-
twe~n attorney and client (ante, §2306)." 8 Wigmore on 
Evidence, §2337. · 
It is hnportant to note, however., that even Dean 'Vigmorc 
qualifies his statement: 
"It follows, tl1erefore, on the other hand, that the privi-
lege does not apply to domestic conduct as such. On the 
other hand, it is equally true that any particular act or con-
duct 'may in fact becom,e the subject of a special confidence 
in the wife alone, i. e., n1ay become a communication to her 
* e * while his domestic acts are ordinarily not to be treated 
as comn1unications, nevertheless it is always conceivable that 
they may by spe~ial circun1stances be made part of a ·con1-
n1unica tion. 
''To formulate a precise test would perhaps be imprac-
ticable." I d. 
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Wigmore recites a great number ·of .cases in his note to 
§2337, the section containing the statements just quoted. The 
important thing to observe, however, is that the great ma-
jority of the cases he cites are contrary to the view he has 
taken. The learned writer does not explain t]1is logical dif-
ficulty; but the syilabi and short digests of the cases prepared 
by Wigmore himself show that the cases contradict him in his 
own treatise. (For exa.n1ple, he cites Jackson v. Jackson, 
40 Ga. 150, and notes that in that case the statement is made 
that the privilege covers ''any fact which came to her knowl-
edge by reason of the confidential relation of husband and 
wife." See the very gTeat number of similar cases in the 
annotation on this s·ubject in vVigmore, §2337.) It is 
abundantly clear that here, as elsewhere, the learned 
23* ""dean is appearing in his role as special pleader for the 
abrogation or restriction of many of the privileges ac-
~orded by the common law. His hostility to the general mari-
tal privileg-e against adverse testin1ony is well known. 
Wigmore's antipathy to common law privileges derives 
largely from his adherence to Jeremy Bentham's legal phil-
osophy, whose work he quotes throughout his treatise. Eg., 
see Vol. 8., pp. 228.:.9. On page 272 of Volume 8 will be found 
this statement: -
''The. progress of acceptance of Bentham's reasoning, in 
its effect on this privilege (against anti-marital facts) has 
not been as rapid as with most others of his proposed re-
forms. 
• 
"The time ought soon to come when these rulings are out-
lawed by reform (as some of them. even now are). · Perhaps, 
before the centenary of~ Bentham's death, no vestige of the 
privilege will remain.'' {page 275.) 
. Unfortunately, it would seem that in limiting the privilege 
tor confidential communications between husband and wife 
to mere verbal statements, Dean Wigmore has followed 
Bentham rather than the cases. That Bentham was a bril-
liant and original writer no one will deny; but that his views 
should govern the disposition of litigation would scarcely be . 
maintained. Acceptance of the dogmas of Jeremy Bentham 
.would result in the abro~at.ion of the entire· common law, be-
cause Bentham opposed the common law, which he called 
"dog law". (He contended that its case-by-case evolution 
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was the kind of law a man made for his dog.) A stri.ct ad-
herence to Bentham would leave us no alternative but to 
institute an elaborate _statutory code such as the countries. 
of continental Europe possess, which was the only type 
24* of *law favored by him. The views of Jeremy Bentham, 
however important philosophically, are not the law of 
this Conunonwealt1t-and should be accorded no weight in re-
stricting or abrog-ating directly or indirectly the privilege 
~gainst confidential communications to which the defendant 
in the case at bar was entitled. 
Having· surveyed the secondary authorities on this ques-
tion, let us now consider judicial holdings. A 'veil-considered . 
and important opinion is Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 
154. Incidentally, it is worthy of note that Wigmore himself 
accords this case a position of prominence in his treatment 
-of privileg·ed comn1unications, and quotes from it extensively 
in the :first two pages of his section treating of that s:nbject. 
(8 Wigmore, pages 636, 637). · It is significant, however, that 
he does not quote the following passage which appears in the 
opinion: 
"The matter that the law prohibits either the ltusband or 
wife testifying· to as witnesses includes any information ob-
tained by either .during the marriage by reason of its exist-
ence. It should not .be confined to mere statements by one to 
the other, but embraces all knowledge upon the part of either 
10btained by reason of the marriage relation, and which but 
for the confidence growing out of it could not have been 
known, and the same rule prevails in full force even after the 
marriag·e relation has been dissolved by death or divorce.". 
In TVhitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913), the 
following language will bq found: · ~ 
"The testimony of Mrs. Kirk recited in full the most inti-
mate relations between herself and her deceased husband 
from their marriage to. his death. .She told about his habit 
of drinking· and intoxication, his hearing of voices and com-
munications with the spirits of the dead, his mutterings and· 
outcries while asleep, the delu~ions which caused him to 
25"" arm himself with guns and pistols, «<backed up by a bot-
tle of whiskey to supply courage, insults offered her, 
and attempts to take his life. True, it appears that he had 
been guilty of similar conduct at other times in the presence 
of others. His conduct and ·declarations in the presence of 
others it is competent for her to relate; but this does not 
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authorize or permit her to testify about similar conduct·-ancl 
declarations made to her alone. 
''We think the major part of Mrs. l{irlt 's testimony comes 
under the condemnation of the rule which prevents one spouse 
from testifying about the acts and words of the other, which 
acts and words were performed or heard when they were 
alone, and· were therefore to be deemed confidential. * "" * 
We· are unable to diff'e1·entiate bet'Wem~ a.cts and words-and · 
cannot appreciate the distinction between words terms ''ver-
bal acts'' and mere words used in the confidential relations 
between husband and wife . 
.. 
''By the policy of the la.w, as 've understand it, the door of 
confidence is closed to all prying eyes and eager ears, never 
.to be opened by the husband Qr wife in a court whose duty 
it is to uphold the rule founded upon the wisdom of time and 
experience. 
''When the husband and wife are alone, everything said 
and done is wnder the protection of the rule ancl the declarar 
tions and conduct of both are presu.med to be confidential . 
• 
. . . 
''Change does not always denote progress, and 'inodern de-
partures frotn ancient ·rules of la'Ui in response to the exi-
gencies of particttlar cases freq'ltently obliterate the ~wisest 
and safest ru,les designed for the protection of society. • 0 * 
We adopt as a sound policy applicable to the wife as to the 
husband, the sentiment expressed in these words: 'Therefore 
shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave 
unto his wife; and they shall be ono flesh.' '' 
In State v. Jolly, 20 N. C. 32 Am. Dec. 656, a similar view 
was strong·ly urged by the North Carolina Court : 
''But it is not enough to throw protection over cmnmunica-
tions . made in the spirit of confidence. The intituacy of the 
marriage union enables each to be a daily and almost constant 
witness to the conduct of the other; and thus in fact a con-
fidence, reaching much farther than that of verbal *com-
26«< municati9ns, is forced upon each of the parties. What 
one may even desire to conceal from all human eyes 
and ears is thus almost unavoidably brought within the ob-
servation of the other .... The rule we deem a valuable one, 
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and we view with apprehension any exception having a: ten-
dency, more or less direct, to promote cunning, or to generate 
dish~ust, where the best interests of society require that per-
fect frankness and confidence_ ought to prevail.'' 
This question arose also in the case of Perry v. Randall, 
83 Ind. 143, a. controversy of this type.: Perry was being sued 
by Randall, who clahned that the forn1er found and kept cer-
tain money belonging to him. Henrietta Perry, the defend-
ant's divorced wife, was allowed to testify as to certain acts 
of the defendant during t]Jeir rnarriage, i. e., that she saw him 
with the money, and saw him count it rind put it in his pocket. 
On appeal, the resultant verdict for the plaintiff was re-
versed: 
''It will be observed, that in her testimony, the witness 
Henrietta. carefully avoided the state1nent of a. single word 
or syllable that was spoken to .her by the appellant, if any 
such was spoken to her by him, in their interview in relation 
to the appellee's lost money. If the 'confidential communica-
tions'· mentioned in the statute must be only such as are ex-
pressed in words, either· spoken or 'vritten, it would seem t(\ 
be clear that the testilnony, above quoted, .of Henrietta Perry 
was not a comrnunication to her from her husband, the ap-
pellant, and was not, therefore, within the prohibition of the 
statute. For, as already said, not a word spoken by the ap-
pellant to the witness, if any were spoken, was detailed by 
her in her testimony. She stated what &he said to or asked 
the appellant, in relation to the appellee's rnoney; and per-
haps, though it rnay well be doubted, that far her testimony 
was contpetcnt ·~ * * It was not necessary that the appellant 's· 
communication to his wife, the witness, in· relation to the 
rnoney, should be o:A11resscd in words. Their interview was 
private and confidential; and the actions of the appellant, in 
the 11resence of his wife, ·in 1·elation to ap1Jellee'-s lost 1noney, 
was such a contn~ttnica.f'ion to her by him that she was not a 
competent witness, under the statute, to testify in regard to 
his actions, without his consent.'' 
27* *People v. Ro,qe1·s, 348 Ill. 322; 180 N. E. 856, is a case 
of much the sanw texture: 
"On the trial of the perjury case, ~fary A.. Rogers was per.-
mitted ·to . testify concerning facts and circumstances which 
occuri·ed during the existence of tlie marriage relation. When 
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she was offered as a witness, plaintiff. in error objected to her 
giving testimony relating to such matters .... 
''She was incompetent to testify as to any communications 
between her and her husband or as to any fact or transaction 
the knowledge of which was obtained by means of the mar-
riage relation ... The strength of the prosecution depended 
largely upon her testimony. It was highly damaging· to the 
defendant, and it is impossible to tell what effect it had upon 
the jury. * * * 
''Because of the error in the admission of incompetent testi-
mony to the prejudice of defendant, the judgment of the 
Criminal Court is reversed and the cause is remanded.'' 
In Sexton v. Sexton, (Iowa) 105 N. W. 314 (1905} the court 
considered Wigmore's contention that the doctrine of pri-
vileged communications concerns only those which are ver-
bal or written. The Iowa Court could not agree: 
"Knowledge may be as effectively communicated in many 
cases by physical acts ·as by words spoken; and, if the lo).owl-
edge imparted is such in character as to come within the spirit 
of the rule, no good ~eason appears for withholding the privi-
lege because of the means of communication adopted.'' 
· State v. Kodat (Mo.), 51 L. R. A. 509 (1900), involved the 
question of whether or not a divorced wife could testify in a 
prosecution against her former husband as to the facts of an 
assault committed by him ag·ainst a third person. The trial 
court had permitted· the wife to testify to the fact of defend-
ant's having :fired a shot at the prosecutrix, but ruled that she 
could not testify as to any statements made by the defendant. 
The Missouri Supreme Court had this to say of the differenti-
ation: 
28~ "'''This ruling is not susceptible of ·division; that is to 
say, evidence of statements made by ~ife and husband 
to each other on the one hand,· and the naked fact of shooting 
at the prosecutrix on the other: Neither was ad'l'f!tissible. • • • 
Was she competent to testify to a fact 'vhich directly showed 
that the husband 'vas guilty of the crime charged in the indict-
ment, to-wit, that he shot at the prosecutrix? We think most 
clearly not. It is the policy of the la'v that things which are 
privileged during the n1arriage relation shall remain forever 
inviolable, whether the relation has ceased by reason of death 
or divorce.'' 
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In Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 56 Am. Rep. 40, the defendant 
was being prosecuted for an alleged burglary. The lower 
court allowed his divorced wife to testify as to Owen's having 
been out late on the night of the robbery, and as to his sub-
sequent possession of money. The appellate court set aside 
the conviction, on the ground that the privilege accorded con-
fidential communications includes facts as well as verbal utter-
ances. 
Numerous other cases are to the same effect. Todd v. Bar- · 
bee, 271 ICy. 38; 111 S. W. (2d) 1040, is a recent Kentucky 
l1olding that statutes privileging confidential communications 
between husband and wife should be liberally construed, and 
should include all knowledge derived by virtue of the marriage 
relation, and 'vhich but for that relation would not have been 
known. Laven,qood v. havenwood (Ind.), 71 N. E. (2d), is 
a 1947 case in which the Indiana Court held that a wife eould 
not testify as to her deceased husband's mannerisms· under 
the statute privileging confidential communications between 
then1. See also Prttdential Insurance Co. v. Pierce's Admrx. 
(Ky.), 109. S. W. (2d) 616 (1938), and McFadden v. Welch 
(l\iiss.), 170 So. 903 (1937), as well as many other late cases, 
for a fully adequate demonstration that the doctrine herein 
contended for is as strongly supported today as ever. 
*In Goodrttn't v. State, 60 Ga. 509, it was held that the 
29* doctrine of privileged communications includes silence: 
" * * *the wife ought to feel* • * as secure that her silence 
will not be disclosed to her detriment or disadvantage, as that 
what she says will not be repeated * • <t • ' ' 
. In Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 Ill. 368, 48 N. E. 820 (1896), acts 
'Of self-abuse by the husband which the wife had observed, were 
held privileged as a confidential communication. In Schreffler 
v. Chase, 245 Til. 395, 92 N. E. 272 (1910), a wife's insane con-
duct was held matter properly 'vithin the privilege afforded 
confidential communications-so that her husband could not 
testify as to that conduct in a will contest following her de-
eease. Pierson v. Illinois C. R. Co., 159 ]\Hch. 110, 123 N. W. 
576 (1909), is an express holding that the privilege includes 
any proffered testimony by the wife as to her husband's physi-
cal condition. (The following testimony in the case at bar 
should be examined in the life of the holding just cited:. 
''Q. * ~ • What was his condition? 
''A. He was sober. 
'' Q. Was he calm, nervous, or what? , 
''A. As a usual thing he is usually nervous all the time." . :. 
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In People v. ·Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N. W. 184, the 
defendant was being prosecuted for having received stolen 
property. It was held that his wife's testimony as to the-
stolen goods having been in his possession should have been 
excluded under the doctrine privileging *confidential 
30~ communications· between husband and wife. 
The judicial authorities taking the same po..sition are-· 
all but legion. . They are so uniform h1 their recognition of 
. the validity and of the breadth of this ancient doctrine of the-
common law, that the latest volun1e of American J urispru-
dence, which was only published a fe,v tnonths ago, states th<: 
following to be the law without noting any dissent thereto. 
whatsoever: 
''The matter that the law prohibits either the husband or 
wifefr.om testifying to as witnesses by reason of the rule privi-
leging communications between them includes any information 
obtained by either during the marriage and by reason of its 
existence. It is not confined to mere statements by one to 
the other, but embraces all kno'wledge on the part ef either, 
obtained by reason of the marriage relation, and which but 
for the confidence growing out of it, would not have been 
known. This is true both at cornmon la'v and under 'statutes. 
declaratory thereof, and this, even though by the terms of 
the statute only 'c-omn1unicatioi1s' between husband and wife 
are privileged. " 58 Am. J lU'. §385 ( 1948). 
It is not on authority alone, however, that counsel for the 
defendant are basing this petition. The authorities, both 
judicial and secondary, support the doctrine now contended 
for-that the rule privileging conununications between hus-
band and ·wife includes conduct and facts as w·ell as mere 
audible staten1ents. But cotu1sel would like to point out that 
principle, reason, and sound policy also dictate this result. 
The very derivation of the 'vord "communications" demon-
strates that it should not be restricted to verbal and writtmi 
statements alone. The word derives frorn the Latin verb 
"communicaTe", which itself is derived from the Latin noun 
"cotnm'ltnis ". This latter word meant "common "-hence the 
verb t t co'lnntu'lzicare'' meant ''to make common,'' or ''to make 
known''. The etymology of this word thus in no 'vay restricts 
its import to verbal and 'vritten *staternents. It is very 
31 * significant that the learned and scholarly Restatement 
of the Law promulgated by the American Law Institute 
is in accord with this view of the word ''communication": 
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"The ·word 'communication' is used to denote the fact that 
one person has brought an idea to the perception of the other." 
~staternent, Torts, §559. 
When Henry Menefee came in after midnight and laid his 
pistol on the mantel in the kitchen in the presence of his wife, 
if in fact he did so, it was as much a c~unicatjou as any 
verbal statement he might have made: ·The idea was just as 
effectively, even n1ore effectively, imparted to his wife than 
if instead of doing it before her, he ·had the next morning 
stated, ''Last night I came in after midnight and· on arrival 
laid my pistol on the mantel in the kitchen". As to the 
~1ypothetical verbal staten1ent, there is not even any conten-
tion of admissibility. On what grounds of logic and principle, 
then, can the act which imparts the same idea be allowed to 
come in 1 An exa1nination of the basic philosophy of the rule 
privileging comn1unications between husband and. wife may 
be of assistance at this point. What is the basis ·of the privi-
lege? In Mercer v. State, 40 :F,la. 216, 24 So. (1898), the follow-
ing policy ·was stated for the privilege: 
''Society has a deeply-rooted interest in the preservation 
of the peace of fatnilies, and in the maintenance of the sacred 
institution of marriage; and its strongest safeguard is to pre-
serve with jealous care any v.iolation of those hallowed confi-. 
deuces inherent in, and inseparable from, the marital status. 
Therefore the law places the bail of its prohibition upon any 
breach of the confidence between husband and 'vife, by de-
claring· all confidential c01nmunications between the1n to be 
incompetent matter for either of then1 to expose as witnesses. 
* ·~ * The reason * * * is found to rest in that public policy 
that seeks to preserve inviolate the peace, good will and limit-
less confidm1ce *between the heads of the family circle 
32° so necessary to every well-ordered civilized society." 
It is stated by the learned trial juqge, in his "Memoran-
dunl of Opinion", that the reason and principle behind the 
rule are not here present, because the 1\!Ienefee marriage has 
been terminated.· The learned judge notes that ''the sovereign 
states of the nation arc bidding against each other for· the 
divorce n1arket, and even our own Commonwealt~ is relaxing 
its rules dealing with the subject of divorce". He also ob-
serves that the Menefee marriage has been terminated. He 
quotes this statement: "The reason ·of the Ia'v is the life of 
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the· law; when the reason ceases the law becomes of no avail.'' 
The learned trial court then makes this observation: 
"In the final analysis I cannot escape the conclusion that 
a rule of law, not based upon statute or reason, should con-
tinue to exist. The reasons behind the common law rule are 
not here present. I do not feel that· it is a court's duty to 
perpetuate a rule, the very foundation of 'vhich has been 
Jost." (~Iemorandum of Opinion, page 8.) 
. It is true, as the trial court has pointed out, that the in-
stitution of marriage is under attack. It is true that states 
with less regard for this institution than our ancient Com-
mon~ealth are ''bidding against each other for the divorce 
market". But that the sacred and sc1·iptural institution of 
marriage is being 'weakened can scarcely be an argument for 
withdrawing one of its strongest supports I The old common 
1aw rule privileging communications between husband and 
· wife, now embodied in Va. Code Ann., §6212, is a very bastion 
of marriage as an institution. It is a strange logic to con-
tend, because the most important of our social, religious, 
rnoral, and legal institutions has been weakened, that one of 
its strongest judicial •safeguards should be removed. 
33* *Of course, the reverse is true. At a time when mar-
riage is under attack, the courts should be especially 
astute, in so far as it lies within their power, to protect and 
safeguard that sacred institution. vVe are not concerned with 
the-Menefee marriage. It proved a failure-, but it can scarcely 
be said that by the failure of this one marriage "the reason 
for the rule has failed". The law is not concerned with the 
Menefees' marriage only. If it 'vere, now that their marriage 
is over, there would be no particular policy in privileging any · 
eonfidential communications between them. But that is not 
the case. The law is concerned with every marriage now in 
effect or ever to be entered into in the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. The law is concerned that every marriage now or ever 
to be in Virginia· shall be accorded every possible legal sup- . 
port and safeguard-so that this most beneficial institution ' 
rnay be bettered and endure. In recognizing, and refusing to 
limit and emasculate, the doctrine of privileged communi-
cations, the law is looking- to the marriages no'v extant and to 
come about in the future, not to the terminated Menefee mar-
riage. I~ the testimony given by Ocie Wade Menefee against 
her former husband, Henry Menefee, is allowed and approved, 
the status of every present and future marriage in Virginia 
will be to some extent impaired. Approval of this testimony 
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will mean that anything that a husband or wife does in the con-
fidence, intimacy and privacy of the marital relation can be 
told once that relation ceases. The most private acts, the 
most secret conduct-nothing will be privileged. Only verbal 
and written statements will then come within the doctrine. 
If that should become the law, then in truth *only a 
34 e re~ic, only a shadow of the majestic rule rendering privi-
leged, communications bet~veen husband and wife, will 
remain. Counsel are confident that this Court will not permit 
S') ancient and honored a doctrine to be abrogated in such a 
manner. 
:vi. CONCLUSION. 
I-Ienry ~Ienefee has been convicted of robbery-but he has 
not been convicted on competent evidence. Not having been 
convicted by competent evidence, it results that he must he con-
. side red innocent, until such time as the Commonwealth by 
evidence admissible under the rules of the common law and by 
Virginia statute, can prove his guilt, if any. But an issue in-· 
finitely greater than the guilt or innocence of· Henry Mene-
fee is now before this court. The question is not whether or 
not Henry Menefee shall have a new trial, but 'vhether the 
institution of marriag·e, the oldest of human institutions, shall 
be supported or derogated. As was set forth in State v. Me-
A 'ltley (Tenn.), 4 Heisk 24, 432 : 
''If this co~tld be pet·rnitted, it woulcl tend to destroy that 
bond of ttn'lttual confidence and u;nquestioning trust that is 
essentiq,l to the peace and happiness of the most sacred of all 
dornestic relations. No man wotttld be willing to have his tvife 
called on in a court of justice to detail the facts of which she 
... Qains a knowledl}e by reason of the fact that she is the com-
panion of his privacy and has unlimited freedom of access to 
all the occurrences that transpire in his ho·me and around the 
fireside.'' 
· It is respectfully submitted that the conviction below should 
he reversed and the defendant, Henry Menefee, accorded ·a 
new trial. · 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas be a'varded him; that his assignments of error 
be declared *well taken and sustained; and that upon a 
35• full hearing, judgment be entered in his favor, dismissing 
this prosecution, or in any event that a new trial be 
granted. 
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Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons for 
reviewing the verdict and sentence of the Court below, and 
hereby ~dopt this petition for a writ of err~r and supersedeas 
as their opening brief. Notice that this petition would be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals. of Virginia 
at Richmod,. and a copy thereof, were mailed to Carrington 
Tho.mpson, E~~~.~attorney for the Commonwealth in Pittsyl-
vama County.s.· on. the 6th day of March, 1949. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HENRY A. MENEFEEr 
By: C. CARTER LEE, 
VIRGIL H. GOODE, 
W. L. JOYCE, 
T. KEISTER GREER, 
His Attorneys_ 
I, C. Carter .Lee·, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in 1ny 
opinion there is sufficient matte·r of error in the record accom-
panying this petition to render it proper that the judgment 
complained of should be reviewed. 
C. CARTER LEE1 Attorney. 
Rocky Mount, V a: .. 
Received March 7, 1949. 
:M.·B. W ATT8, C1erk-
Mar. 8, 1949. Writ of error and sup~rsedeas awarded by 
the Court. No bond required. 
M.B. W. 




In the" Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 
County. · 
ON INDICTMENT FOR ROBBERY. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County-September 22, 
1948. 
SPECIAL GRAND JURY. 
J. Tom Clark, Foreman, B. E. Davidson,. Obie Minter, o·wen 
. Minter, J. Edgar Dalton, Otis T. Jackson and Irvine Burton, 
(Colored), were sworn a Special Grand Jury of Inq1,1est in 
and for the body of the County of Pittsylvania, which Special 
Grand Jury of inquest was sun1moned by the Sheriff of· this· 
County from a list furnished him by the Judge of this Court. 
After having received their charge, they were sent out of the· 
Courtroon1 and after some time returned into the Courtroom 
and reported the following indictments: 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Charles David Price alias Charlie Price. 
Indicted for Murder. A True Bill. 
Common,vealth of Virginia 
v. 
1
1 • Daniel Alfred Simon. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Indicted for Murder. A True ·Bill. 
J. T. CLARK,.Foreman. 
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Commonwealth of Virginia 
'l). 
Fred Pannell. 
Indicted for Malicious Shooting. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Julian Curtis Oliver. . 
Indicted for Petit Larceny-3rd Offense. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
page 2 ~ Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
William David Green, Jr. 
llidicted for Grand Larceny. A True Bill. 
Commonwealth of 1Virginia 
v. 
Charles Farmer. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Indicted for Malicious Shooting. A True Bill. 
· Commonwealth of !Virginia 
v. . 
Willie James Cole. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Indicted for Storehouse Breaking. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Commonwealth of ;viriinia 
.. v. 
Douglas ~arker. 
1 Indicted for Murder. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
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Commonwealth of ;virginia 
v. 
Sherman StaTions. 
Indicted for Grand Larceny. ·A True Bill. 
Commonwealth of ;Virginia 
'V. 
Henry .A:. Menefee. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Indicted for Robbery by Violence. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
Commonwealth of ;virginia 
v. 
Curtis G .. Thurston~ 
Indicted for Grand Larceny. A True Bill. 
J. T. CLARK, Foreman. 
And the said Special Grand Jury of Inquest having nothing 
further to present at this time were discharged. It is ordered 
that the said Special Grand Jurors 'Qe allowed the following 
amounts for their services and mileage in coming to and re-
turning from said Court at this term: J. Edgar Dalton-
$4.90; Otis T. Jackson-$5.50; Obie Minter-$5.50; B. E. 
Davidson-$4 .. 50; Owen Minter-$5.50; Irvine Burton-$5.00; 
.J. T. Clark-$3.50. 
page 3 } Commonwealth of Virginia, 
County of Pittsylvania, to-wit: 
In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia. 
The Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and for the 
body of the County of Pittsylvania, now attending said court 
at its. September term, in the yea~ upon their oaths 
present that Henry A. Menefee orr-t:lle ·24Th day May in the 
yeat,J94.7, in said County. On one Erne~niously 
did ~ake an assault and by the threat and presenting of a 
deadly weapon, to-wit: a pistol, him the said Ernest Gilbert 
in bodily fear feloniously did put, and one iron safe containing 
more than one tho"Q.sand ($1,000.00) Dollars in United States 
Currency of the ·property of the said Ernest Gil6ert, in the 
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presence, custody and control of the said Ernest Gilbert, then 
and there, to-wit: On the day and year aforesaid, in the 
County aforesaid, feloniously. and violently did steal, take and 
carry away against the peace and dignity of the Common-
wealth of Virginia~ 
I 
TillS INDICTMENT is found on the evidence of J. A~ 
Bingham, W. F. Haden, witnesses sworn in Court and sent to 
the Grand Jury~ . 
ENDORSEMENTS: 
Comirionwealth of- Virginia 
v. . 
HenrY: A. Menefee~ 
INDICTMENT FOR ROBB-ERY BY VIOLENCE .. 
A True BilL 
J. T. CLARI{, Foreman .. 
"We the Jury find the Defendent Guilty & fix his Punish-
ment at 10 years in Prison.'' 
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H. C. lviARSHALL, Foreman .. 
W. C. TH01YIPSON, 
Commonwealth's Attorney .. 
In the Circuit Co.urt of Pittsy Ivania County-November 
30, 1948. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Henry A. Menefee, Defendant. 
INDICTED FOR ROBBERY BY VIOLENCE. 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and 
Henry A. 1\{enefee who stands indicted of a felony, to-wit, ap-
peared in Court according to the ·conditions of his recog-
nizance, was arraigned and after consultation with his coun-
sel pleadcd.not guilty to the indictment. Whereupon a jut~y, 
to-wit: Carlton .Adatns, D. B. Blair, J. W. Wilkerson, D. W.' 
I' 
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Blair, General Van Hook, John B. Coleman, J. B. Farson, 
J. S. Easley, Alfred Cunningham, (Colored), H. C. Mar-
shall, Anthony Pollard and James \V. Davis was selected 
in the manner prescribed by law, and duly sworn the truth 
of and upon the premises to speak, and having heard the 
evidence, the instructions of the court, and the argument of 
counsel upon their oath do say: "We the Jury :find the De-
fendant Guilty & fix his Punishment at 10 years in Prison. 
H. C. :1\iarshall, Foreman.'' Thereupon the defendant, by 
counsel, moved the Court to set aside. the verdict of the Jury 
on the following· grounds : 
~· Because of improper evidence admitted on pehalf of the 
Commonwealth over objection by the defendant. · 
2. Because the verdict is contrary to the law. and the 
eVidence. 
The Court docs not pass upon· said motions at this time, but 
sets December 10, 1948, for argnment of counsel concerning the 
same. 
And the prisoner 'vas remanded to Jail. 
page 5 r iVirginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania C,ounty-.December 10, 
1948. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff, 
v. . 
Henry A. Menefee, Defendant. 
INDICTED FOR ROBBERY BY VIOLENCE. 
This day came again the Attorney for the Commonwealth, 
and the defendant Henry A. lvienefee, by Virgil Goode and 
W. L. Joyce, his counsel, and the Court heard argument of 
counsel on the nwtion to set aside the verdict of the jury ren-
dered in this case on the 30th day of November, 1948. 
The Court does not pass upon said motion· at this time, but 
takes time to consider. 
And this case is continued and the defendant remanded to 
Jail. 
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In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County-January 18, 
1949. 
Com1nonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Henry A. Menefee, Defendant 
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INDICTED FOR ROBBERY BY VIOLENCE. 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and 
_the defendant in proper person, and by W. L. Joyce and Virgil 
Goode, his attorneys, and the Court having· maturely consid-
ered the motion of the defendant by counsel, to set aside the 
verdict of the jury rendered in this case on the 30th day of 
November, 1948~ and arguments pertaining thereto heard by 
the Court on the lOth day of Decem.ber, 1948, doth overrule 
the said motion, to which action of the Court, the defendant 
by counsel excepted; · · 
Upon the grounds previously assigned, 
First: The admission of testimony of Ocie Wade ~rene­
fee, for the Commonwealth, because she was an incompetent 
witness, because she was the divorce¢! wife of the defendant, 
and she testified as to the fa~ts, knowledge and information 
which she obtained during· coverture. 
Second: To set aside the verdict on the grounds that the 
· verdict was contrary· to the law and evidence, be-
page 7 ~ cause the Commonwealth never placed the defend:-
ant at or near tl1e scene of the alleged crime, at the 
time the crime was committed. 
And it being demanded of the said Henry A. Menefee if 
anything for himself he had or knew to say why the court 
should not now proceed to pronounce judgment against him 
according to law, and nothing being offered or alleged in de-
lay of judgment, it is considered by the court that the said 
·Henry A. Menefee be confined in the penitentiary of this 
Commonwealth for the period of Ten Years, (10), the period 
by the jurors in their verdict ascertained. 
And the defendant, by counsel, indicating his desire to ap-
ply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ 
of error and supersedeas to the said judgment., it is ordered 
that execution of judgment ·be suspended until Sixty Days, 
(60) from this date. 
And the prisoner was remanded to Jail. 
.pa.ge 8 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania ·County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
'V. 
Henry A. Menefee 
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CERTIFICATE. 
I, Kennon C. Whittle, Judge of the Circuit Court of Pitt-
sylvania County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the follow-
ing evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth and of the de-
fendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all of the 
evidence that was introduced on the trial of this cause, to-
gether with the objections to the evidence, or any part there-
of, offered, admitted, rejected or striaken out, and that the 
instructions hereinafter set forth were all requested by either 
the Commonwealth or the defendant, and that there were no 
objections to the instructions offered on behalf of the Com-
monwealth or of the defendant; Instructions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
having been requested by the Commonwealth and granted by 
the Court, without objection, and Instructions A., B, C, D and 
E being all of the instructions requested on behalf of the de-
fendant and granted by the Court, without exception: 
page 9 } Index. 
page 10 ~ Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Henry A. 1\fenefee 
ROBBERY BY VIOLENCE. 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Piitsylvania, at :the 
Courthouse thereof, in Chatham, Virginia, on Tuesday, No-
vember 3~onorable Kennon C. Whittle, Judge, 
presiding. 
Appearances: Mr. Carrington Thompson, Common-
wealth's Attorney of Pittsylvania County, and Mr. Joseph 
Whitehead, Jr., both of Chatham, Virginia, for the Common-
wealth. 
Mr. Virgil H. Goode of Rocky Mount, Virginia, and Mr. 
·w. JJ. Joyce of Stuart., Virginia, for the Defendant. · 
·The following evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth 
and of the defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is 
all the evidence that was introduced on the trial of thi~ case: 
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JESSIE GILBERT (colored), 
the first witness called on behalf of the Commonwealth~ hav-
ing been first duly sworn, testified : 
DIRECT EXA1\1IN.ATION. 
By Mr. Whitehead: 
Q. Your nam~ is Jessie Gilbert? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
page 11 ~ Q. You are the widow of Ernest Gilbert f 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. Wer:e you at home on the night of May 24, 1947, when 
your husband:_wa:s shot and killed~ 
.A. Yes, sir; I was there. 
Q. Where were you~ 
A. I was setting in the house. 
Q. About what time of night was it? 
A. I reckon it was about nine o'clock or maybe a little 
after. · 
Q. You were setting there in the house¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. Just tell the Court and Jury what happened from the 
time the men first got there until it was all over. 
A. Well, we eat supper, and then we went out to the kitchen 
~nto the house, and Ernest set down by ·the bed where he 
gen~rally set, and I set down by the bureau, and my little 
grandson set down besides me, and my baby boy got on the 
bed, and my little granddaug·bte1~ laid down on the bed., and 
they went to sleep. And in a little while, we heard a car 
come in the yard, and the dogs began to bark, and I told my 
little gTandson to go into the kitchen to speak to the dogs; 
and when he went in there, two men came up to th'e kitchen 
door, and he asked where was your father, and he said, "In 
the house''. So they came up on the porch and in the kitchen, 
and when they came in the kitchen, Ernest CQl1ld see them 
in the kitchen, and he said, ~ come on in''. 
page 12 ~ A tall man and a kind of low man-and they kept 
on to where he was setting, and they stopped right 
there before hin1, and be said, '' I-Iave yon anything to drink?'' 
And he said, "No, I haven.'t anything". And he said, "Do 
you want anything Y '' And he said, ''No. I don't believe I 
do." And they said, ''You all set right here where you 
are''. And they said, ''Where are the boys''; and be said, 
"What boys1" And they said, "The boys that live here 
in the house''. And they saw the baby boy laying over on 
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the bed, and he said, "No, that is my baby." And then they 
both drew guns, and they said, ''Don't any of you move or 
we will kill you", and fhey said, "A filling station has been 
robbed, and we want to see if there is anything here that 
belonged to it''. So Ernest set on ·and I set on. And the 
tall man walked on away from where Ernest was, and I had 
a dress at the foot of my bed. l-Ie said, "I am going to take 
this down. I want to see through here.'' All the doors was 
open. He went on through into the little hall way and into 
my front room and he just opened the door, and this other 
man stood there holding the gun on Ernest. · The baby boy 
hadn't even woke up at this time, and I heard the safe, and 
I said to myself, ''He is taking that safe out of the room"." 
He rolled it out of the front door into the hallway, and when 
Ernest heard him rolling it, he said, "What is this?" And 
he said, "That is all right, what it is; you set still" .. And 
when Ernest heard this safe get to the hall door Ernest at-
tempted to get up, and this man shot, and Ernest reached 
up, and grabbed him by the hand, and they 
page 13 ~ scuffled awhile and he continued to shoot-they 
rolled over on the table and back on the bed. They 
continued to shoot. And Ernest said, ''James, hand me my 
gun", and j"ffijies started to his daddy, and the man threw 
the gun on him and I said, ''Don't go there. He will kill 
you'', and James set back on the bea;-and finally Ernest 
t•olled him over ~nd James reached and g·ot the gun ~d 
handed it to his daddy. Any way, they k_ept shooting, and 
this man ·hollered, said, ''Some of you will have to come here 
and help me". They started shooting through the window" 
the bullets coming from the side, and En1est rolled down 
dead, and while they were scuffling· the car backed up to the 
porch. I know that it was somebody out there to drive the 
car up in the yard. while these two nten were in the house. 
Q. You say there was shooting .throug·h the windows Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did the ball con1e throug·h the windows? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that a picture of the outside window, the bullet came 
through 1 (Handing picture to witness.) 
A. Yes,· sir. 
Mark thi_s (picture) Exhibit "A". 
Q. Is this the picture of the inside of the ho_use, the pic-
ture of the window¥ (Hands picture to witness.) 
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. A. Yes, sir, that is the kitchen and that is the middle 
door. 
page 14 } Q. Whereabouts were you~ 
. A. I was setting back next to the bureau (indi-
ea tirig on. picture). 
Picture :filed, marked Exhibit "B' '. 
Another picture introduced n1arked Exhibit '' C' '. 
Q .. Is this a picture of the front of the house Y 
A:..· :Yes, sir. 
• Q. Aunt Jessie, what about the sa£ e-. what was in . the 
safeY 
A.' ·He had all l1is little earnings in the safe, all of his 
money in the safe. , . 
, Q. Do you know how much was in it? 
A. No, sir, I do not kno'v how much 'vas in it. I do not. 
Q. This man-have you ever seen this man, Menefee, down 
there at your house! 
A. Yes, sir, I have seen him, but I knowed him by the name 
of ''Boo". . . 
Q .. How many times has ''Boo'' ]\Jfenefee been to your house 
in the last few years, say in the last five yea~·s Y 
A. I just don't know. 
Q. Tell the Jury what you think' 
·A. I just wouldn't like to say,, but I just don't know how 
many, but I know he has been there five or six times, or 
maybe more than that. 
Q. Did he ever bring· his wife with him Y 
A. Yes, sir, he has. 
page 15 } Q. Did qe know where the safe was? 
· . . . A. Yes, sir. 
: Q. Has he seen ]Urnest take money out of the safe and put 
moriey in the safe? 
A. Yes, sir, he certainly had. 
Q. What was ].fenefee down there about¥ 
A. Him· and Ernest transacted business in the liquor busi-
ness. · 
Q. About the shooting through the window, where did the 
ball that came throug·h the window lodge? 
A. One hit right at the middle of the kitchen door, and 
two bullets went on over the top of my dresser, between the 
fire place and the middle door. · 
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Q. Fire place and wall, you mean Y 
A. Yes, sir, right over the top of the bureau. 
Q. Did any one come there and cut the bullets out? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know who did 1 
A. Mr. Bingham, I don't know whether he cut it out- Mr. 
Archer was there. I think he cut one out. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Goode: 
Q. How long had your husband been selling whiskey-. 
<>ver what period of years? · 
A. About four or five years he had been hand-
page 16 ~ ling it around-lots of time he didn't handle it, 
but he did take care of it for people. 
·Q. He had been selling liquor for twenty or twenty-five 
years? . 
A~ I don't know. We always kept some. 
Q. Ife didn't make any liqu~r Y 
A. He made some in his young days. . 
Q. He had been selling liquor and buying liquor for a long 
period of time? . 
A. For a number of years, yes, sir. 
Q. And he purchased whiskey from different people, didn't 
heY 
A. Yes., sir, he did. 
Q. He had numer.ous people in Franklin County that hauled 
him whiskey from time to timeT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They had the same kind of transactions with him, and 
they saw him put the money in a safeY 
A. Yes. 
Q. And all in this vicinity where he lived, he sold whiskey 
to various people, colored and white 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And of course he would have to make change occa-
sionally! 
A. Yes, sir, he did. 
page 17 } Q. And he clidn 't carry all of his money on his 
person, did heY · 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. And he would have to go to the safe to make change. 
Cou.ld you give an estimation of about ho"' many hundred 
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people knew where that safe was-was it one hundred and 
fiftyY 
A. No. 
Q. One hundtoo f 
A. No. A lot of the people in the neighborhood didn't 
even know he had one. 
Q. Didn't know he had a safe. You testified as to the 
people who came through the door. That was the kitchen 
door. You said one was shoi·t and the ·other one was a tall 
manY 
A. Yes. . 
Q. And I believe you testified that the low, heavy-set one 
was Whitlow? 
A. I did. . 
Q. And that the tall -one, you didn't get a 1ook at him 1 
A. I didn't get a look at either one of them in the face. 
Q. Could you identify the tall one if you ever saw him 
ag·ainY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever seen the tall fellow since then Y 
A. I think so. . 
page 18 ~ Q. You have Y I want to ask you this : Did you 
see any one outside of your house that night Y 
. A. No, sir, I didn't. 
Q. Do .You know what kind of car was on the outside Y 
· A. No, sir. · . 
Q. Could you tell whether it was a truck or passenger 
carY · 
A. I couldn't tell nothing about it. I just know one backed 
up in the yard. 
LIEUTENANT ·J. A. BINGHAI\1: 
of the Virginia State Police, having been first duly sworn7 
testified: 
DIRECT EXA1.1INATION. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
Q. You are Lieutenant J. A. Bingham of the Virginia State 
Police. 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. How long· have you been in police work Y 
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of the State Police to work on the Earnest Gilbert case some 
time during 1947? 
A. That is right. . 
Q. Lieutenant, have you had occasion to cut any bullets 
out of the wall down there¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 19 ~ Q. Since the \Vhitlow trial Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. IIow many did you cut out1 
A. Two. Cut then1 out the 4th of August. 
Q. This year f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q . .Are these the two bullets? 
A. Tha.t is the envelope I put them in. 
Q. \Vould you n1ind opening it there~ (Hands witness en-
velope, which Lt. Bingham opened.) 
A. I got the bullets out and put them in an envelope and 
Rent thern to the F. B. I. in Washington. I reckon they are 
in this box. 
Q. vVhere did you get this gun 1 
0·. Up at 1\fenefee 's at Rocky Mount. 
Q. This man f 
1\ir. Joyce: . If Your Honor please, I probably l1ave an ob--
jection to that on the ground that I assigned in objecting to 
l\fr. Thmnpson 's opening- statement. If the evidence came 
from the source to which I objected awhile ago,, I object to it 
again. 
1\ir. Thompson: I guess we may as well clear up that mat-
ter now, if Your Honor please. 
, · The Court, Attorney for the Commonwealth and 
page 20 ~ Attorneys for the defendant retired to the Judge's 
chambers, the court reporter not having been 
present, it was stipulated between the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney and the Attorneys for the defendant that, out of the pres-
ence of the Jury and in the Judge's chambers, Mr. Joyce, 
counsel for the defendant objected to the questi<;>n propounded 
Lt. Bingham as to where he secured the gun.in question, and 
the question then arose as to the admissibility of testimony 
frmn Ocie Wade Menefee, the divorced wife of the defendant, 
the question of her testifying having been brought up in the 
Commonwealth's opening statement and objection having been 
n1ade, and the question of the admissibility of her . evidence 
was discussed at length; the defendant, by counsel, objecting 
to her being allowed to testify as to any communication, mat-
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ter or fact which came to her knowledge concerning Henry A. 
Menefee, her husband, during marriage, the said Ocie Wade 
Menefee having secured a divorce from the defendant on .July 
6, 1948. Objection 'vas made by counsel for--defendant a.Ltg 
her testifying as to any mattP;,· ~;; ~P~ which came to her . 
knowledge as the ~eiuiibaWfrA<i£ the said defendan~ 
d1Irjng marriage. as to any communication between them, an 
that the communi~S-1~~re__E.ot hi!ttteetto_m..e;:~v.~r..hal acts, 
and f~ther. thai she_ could-not _testify as t.o a.11ytl~!!lg !l}at 
occurred dnring_tb,e time thaL.sh.e..~,IDJS married. The Court 
overruled the objection of the defendant and ruled that she 
could testify to facts relative to the case that were ob~ai~~g by 
her own k.B:e~ge, but s4e would not be allowed to testify 
as to matters s::ommunjcated to hor by Menefee during covQr-
ture, and communications being used in a narrow sense as to 
any expressions ~n1>\· oral. Counsel for defendant ex-
cepted o . e rliifiigofihe Court upon the grounds 
page 21 }- above stated, and it 'vas understood that· such ob-
jection and exception would apply as to the testi-
mony. Thereupon, the Court and counsel returned to the 
courtroom and the trial proceeded in the presence of the de-
fendant and the jurors. 
Q. Where did you get this gun, Lieutenant~ 
A. From Mrs. Menefee, Rocky ~Iount. 
. Q. And I believe you took the gun and the bullets that you 
'·extracted from the Gilbert house to the F. B. I. in Washing-
tonY · 
A. I sent them up. 
Q. Did you get any part of her automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you get this, Lieutenant Y (Referring to 
piece· from an automobile.) 
A. Got it off of Mrs. Menefee's car . 
. Q. Did you also get a photostatic copy of the title to that 
automobile Y 
A. Yes, sir, it was in her husband's name. 
Q. Who owned that car in May, 19477 
A. According to D. M. V. records-
Objection by Mr. Joyce. 
' Q. Here is the title-. 
r 
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Judge Whittle: Is there any objection to the title, Mr. 
Joyce? 
Mr. Joyce: No, sir. 
Q. Lieutenant, according to the title there, in whose name 
'vas that vehicle registered in 7 
page 22 ~ .A. It was in the n~me of Henry Angel Menefee. 
Q. What address 7 
A. Rocky Mount. 
Q. When was it transferred from him Y 
A. The 29th of May, 1947. 
Q. Transferred t'o whom 7 
.A. Mrs. Ocie Wade Menefee . 
. Q. And I believe the vehicle was in her possession at the 
time you took this part off? 
A. Yes, sir, I took it to the Chevrolet Motor Company in 
Rocky ~fount and had·it taken off. 
Q. "\Vhat kind of car is itt 
A. '40 Club Coupe. 
Q. ·I ·would like to introduce this as Exhibit "D" (referring 
to piece from automobile). Now, Lieutenant, were you able 
to locate the safe in this case 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhere did you find the safe Y 
A. I found it up on 'vhat they call the Ferrum J\.Iountain 
beyond Ferrum, I would say Northwest of Ferrum, above that 
boy's .college. 
Q. Who told you where the safe was 7 
Q. Mrs. Menefee told me that it was over in or under a 
junk pile on the mountain. 
page 23} Mr. Joyce: We object to that. 
Judge Whittle: The objection will have to be sus-
tained, sir.· Gentlemen of the Jury, I don't~know where this 
evidence is leading to, but any statement .mad~ by Mrs. Mene-
fee is inadmissible in this case, and the Jury should disregard 
any statement made by her. 
Q. Is tl1at a picture of where the safe was found, Lieu-
tenant? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you are there at the spot (indicating on 
picture) 7 
A .. Yes, sir. 
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Q. I would like to introduce this marked Exhibit '' E' '. And 
these are pictures of the same general view! 
A. Yes, same rlunk pile. · 
Q. When did you find the safe? 
A. 22d of March. 
Other pictures of junk pile filed marked Exhibits "F'", 
"G", "H", and "I" . 
. . 
Q. (After a small'safe had been rolled into the Courtroom,. 
in front of Jury) Is that the safe you dug up, Lieutenant Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you took it back to Ernest Gilbert's for 
identification? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you present when the identification was 
page 24 ~ made? · 
A. Yes, sir. · 
1\tir. Joyce: I object to that. 
Judge Whittle: The objection will be sustained. 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor please, for the record, now I 
desire to object to all of the testimony of this witness 'vith 
respect to acquiring a pistol introduced in evidence from Mrs. 
Menefee, the wife of the defendant, and I also object to all 
of the evidence with respect to the back of the automobile 
taken from her auton1obile, on the ground: 
(1) That that is an indirect way of permitting a wife to 
testify against her husband. I o'bject on the further gTound 
that unless properly identified and connected, that none of 
this evidence has any relevancy to any issue in this case. 
Judge Whittle: I assume that the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney intends to go forward and connect it. The objection at 
this stage will be sustained unless it is connected. 
Mr. Joyce: Assuming it is connected, we may want to ask 
Lieutenant Bingham a question or two. 
page 25 r CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Joyce: 
Q. Lieutenant Bingham, is that a 1923 model Smith and 
Weston Pistol that you introduced in evidence Y 
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A. I 'vouldn't say. I only have the serial number. 
Q. I believe you testified in the case that was tried here 
last January, the case of the Commonwealth versus Elton 
Whitlow, did you not~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this the same pistol to which you testified at that 
time? 
A. No, sir, this is another pistol. 
Q. "'\Vherc is the pistol that you introduced in evidence in 
that case 1 
A. It is in the possession of the Commonwealth's Attorney 
that I delivered it to. 
Q. You testified in that case that that pistol introduced at 
that time was the pistol used over there T 
A. I wasn't the one that found the pistol. The pistol was 
delivered to 1ne eight or ten days after this robbery, last year. 
Q. It was not this pistol, then, that you had at the time; but 
you did introduce another pitstol at that time through your 
testimony~ 
A. Yes, sir, there was another pistol here. 
A. ·A.s a matter of fact you testified at that time 
page 26 ~ you had taken that pistol and had sent it to Spring-
field for identification? 
A. vVe sent it up there. 
Q. And you traced it down to the Nelson Hardware in 
Roanoke, and there your line was broken, and you couldn't 
trace it anv further¥ 
A. That .. is correct. Yes, sir. 
~Ir. Joyce: If Your llonor please, we will stand the wit-
ness aside until I see whether· or not a connection is properly 
made of this testin1ony to which I objected. If it is, then I 
might want to recall him for further cross examination. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\1IN.A.TION. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
Q. This gun that was introduced here with you, did you 
have that gun at the other trial1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you ever seen it~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And the gun to which ~Ir. Joyce was :~;eferring is one 
that was given to you as found at the scene of the killing?· 
A. Yes, sir, as the one they said was found there. 
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the next 'vitness, after·first having been duly.sworn, 
testified: 
Judge Whittle: Gentlemen, in view of the Court's ruling 
in this matter, do you want to talk to that witness before 
you put her on the stand 1 
Mr. Thompson: All right, sir. 
(The Attorneys representing the Commonwealth conferred 
with the witness, Mrs. l\1:enefee out of the Courtroom, after 
which they returned to the Courtroom and the hearing was 
resumed.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
Q. I believe you are Mrs. Ocie vVade lVIenefee? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you are the divorced wife of this manY 
A. Yes, sir. /ll'-1 ~ 
Q. When were yoy(cliv_orced fr9m him, Mr~. MenefeeY 
A. It was J:Wy.-Z, I t1unk, when I got my papers. 
Q. Where did you and your h.usband live in 19477 
A. At Rocky Mount, Franklin County. Q. How far from Rocky ~fount Y 
·A. About a mile and a half or two miles. 
Q. Can you tell us whose gun this is? 
A. It is ''Boo's". 
Q. That is your husband's nickname? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 28 ~ Q. Did you see that gun on the night of May 24, 
1947Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was it? 
A. It was on the wardrobe or the mantel in the kitchen. 
Q. Who put it there? 
A. He did. 
Q. I don't want you to-ask you to testify .to anything he 
said. . I am going to ask you some of the things he did. What 
time did he come in that night? 
A. Between twelve and two in the night. I don't know 
·exactly. · 
Q. All right. What was his condition Y 
A. He was sober. 
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Q. Was he calm, nervous, or what 7 
A. As a usual thing, he is usually nervous all the time. 
Q. I believe you own a Chevrolet automobile? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you get that car? 
A. He gave it to me before he left. He put it ·m my name 
before be went to pull time.. 
Q. Did you see this hack taken from that carf 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the same car he gave you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who had that car on the night of Saturday, 
page 29 r ~fay 241 
A.. He did. 
Q. Do you remember what time he left home? 
.A. I don't know, but he told me he was going-
1\fr. Joyce: We object. 
Judge Whittle: Objection sustained. 
A. (continued) It was around three o'clock, I believe .. 
Q. And the next time you saw him was between twelve and 
two? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that when you saw him put the pistol on the ward-
l'Obe when he came in that night¥ 
A. Yes,"sir, I think so, just as he came in. 
Q. 1\frs. Menefee, a short time after this, after May 24, did 
you see him-state whether or not you saw him attempting 
to do anything with the car, the back end of the car f 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor please, that is a leading question, 
I submit. 
Judge Whittle: I don't know that it is. He says, "state 
whether or not''. 
Mr. Joyce: · It is suggesting an answer, I submit. 
Judge Whittle: It is suggesting. 
Q. All right. State whether or not you saw him about this 
time take a razor blad~ 
Judge Whittle: Objection sustained. 
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page 30 ~ Q. Did you see him do anything at all to the carr 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he doT 
A. He was n1essing 'vi th the back. 
Q. What was he doing? 
Judge Whittle~ Answer the question, if you can, witness. 
A. I don't know. ·what he did to it, but he was messing with 
the lid. · 
Q. You mean this part right here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what he did-did he have any kind of in-
strument or anythingY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What¥ 
A. Razor blade. 
Q. Mrs. 1\{enefec, this safe right here 'vas found in the gen-
eral neig·hborhood of Fe'rrum. I think you know where it was .. 
State whether or not you took your husband up in that gen-
eral vicinity after this robbery~ 
Mr. Joyce: We object to that. 
Judge Whittle: On what groundf 
Mr. Joyce: I don't see 'vhere that has any bearing on this 
case. 
Judge Whittle: It n1ay have. I don't know. 
page 31 ~ A. Y cs, I did. 
Q. You drove .him in your carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many times~ 
A. Two or three. I am not sure. 
Q. Can you give us some idea 'vhere he was between ~fa~ 24-
and when he went to the Federal Prison in July? 
A. No, sir, I cannot, except I think he was in J\!Iissouri. 
Mr. Joyce: I object to her thoughts. If she lrno,vs where 
he was, she can testify, but she can't testify to a mere opinion. 
Judge Whittle: You. can develop what she bases her 
thoughts on on cross examination. 
Q. In other words, he went away, Mrs. ~ienefee ¥ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. How l<?ng was he away¥ 
.A. Two weeks, I think. 
Q. Do you know where he was the next night after this Y 
A. We were either at home or in Roanoke. ·. 
Q. Do yori re1uember going to Roanoke for a few days after 
this? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are positive, but you don't know the exact date? 
A. No, sir, I ca~not tell. 
page 32 ~ The Court and counsel retire to the Judge's 
chambers where the following took place: 
1\fr. Joyce : Now, if Your Honor please, I desire to object 
to all of the testilnony of this witness on the ground that a 
wife is not permitted to give testimony against her husband, 
and that all of this is evidence that is prohibited for that 
reason. 
Judge 'Vhittle: I don't think it is evidence that the statute 
prohibits. The objection will be overruled. 
1\ir. Joyce: Yes, sir, I would llke to save the point. I de-
sire permission to cross examine tllis witness without waiving 
our objections as to her testimony. 
The Court and Counsel return to the courtroom. 
CROSS EXAl\1INATION. 
By ~Ir. Joyce: 
Q. No'v you say you don't know where your husband was 
on the night following l\1.ay ~' but you think that he was at 
hmne or that you and he were in Roanoke. Were you around 
home for a_ few days just after ~lay 24, and was he there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You spoke of him going away. There was a boy by the 
name of Jones on whose bond your husband had gone who 
had skipped his bond, and he had gone afte:r hin1, hadn't he? 
A. No, sir, he didn't. 
Q. Wasn't Jones away· at that time? 
A. He lives in Missouri. 
Q. And your husband was on his bond? 
page 33 ~ A. I don't know whether he was or not. 
Q. Well, were you on the bond Y 
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A. No, sir, I was not. 
Q. Well, you ]plow that you were on his bond and he 
skipped itY 
Mr. Thompson: I object. 
A. No, sir, I have never been on Roy Jones' bond. 
Judge Whittle: He is trying to develop where he was. Go 
nhead. 
Q. Don't you know that you were on his bond and he 
skipped itY 
. A. No, sir. 
Q. He did skip his bond¥ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You do know he was convicted in Court Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever hear about that Y 
A. I guess I did, but I don't remember it. 
Q. You remember him and Roy working together and you 
remember that they both got caught Y 
A. Roy did. I don't think my husband did. 
Q. And you can't remmnber anything about Jones' bond Y 
A. I probably do, but I just can't recall it now. 
Q. Didn't you go up to the Trial Justice's office 
page 34 ~ at the time when J.ones 'vas charged with this 
offense¥ · 
A. I can't recall ·it. 
Q. Is your memory of other things to which you have testi-
fied any more clear than this Y 
A. I am certain it is. 
Q. Why is it you are clear on some things and ·unclear on 
others! 
A. I just don't look after other people's business. 
Q. You actually signed the bond down in jail Y 
A. I probably did,. but I don't remember. 
Q. Can you give us a good reason why you are clear about · 
sbme things Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is itY 
A. It has done worried me to death, and I just can't go 
through with it any more. 
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. Q. Before 1\tlr. Bingham or Lieutenant Bingham got this 
back off of your car, you wrecked it didn't you Y 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Andit bunged up the back of it, didn't it7 
A. No, it did TIQt. 
Q. How many times did you wreck that car before Lieu· 
tenant Bingham got it off¥ 
. A. I didn't wreck the back but once, but I 
page 35 } wrecked the car twice. It jammed the lid. 
Q. The car had been in two wrecks 7 
A. Not the back. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\ITNATION. 
By 1\:fr. Thompson: 
Q. Is this the same back (indicating piece of car exhibited 
1Jefore the Jury) that was on the car on May 24, 1947? 
A.· Yes, sir. 
· AGENT GEORGE A. BERLEY 
Qf the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the next witness, hav-
ing been first duly sworn, testified: · . 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By 1\:fr. · Thompson: 
Q. I believe y.ou are 1vfr. George A. Berley? 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. 'Vhat is your occupation, 1\tir. Berley? 
A. I am employed ·as a Special Agent in the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, and I am assigned to the F. B .. I. 
Laboratory at Washington, D. C. I examine bullets, cart-
ridge eases and firearms for the purpose of dete_rmining 
'vhether or not a certain bullet or cartridge case was fired 
from a certain e·un-
Q. IIow do you do this f 
A. In the examination of firearms, there are certain mark-
ings left on the parts of the guns as they are 
page 36 ~ manufactured. Now in the manufacture of a gun 
barrel, tools are employed to cut the rifling into 
the gun barrel. As the tool moves throug·h the interior of 
the gun barrel, there are certain little nicks or scratches on 
the surface of• the tool. As the tool passes through the gun 
barrel, these nicks or scratches are constantly changing, and. 
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again, the nicks. and scratches on the tool are left on the 
interior of the gun barrel as the tool moves through the gun 
barrel. These nicks or scratches, when a bullet is fired 
through a gun barrel, is imparted to the bullet. So no two 
gun barrels have the same scratches on the inside. Now 
when two bullets are fired through the gun barrel, there are 
the scratches _of the gun barrels left on the bullets, and the 
scratches that are found on the bullets are examined misro-
scopically. ·It is by comparing the scratches on the bullets 
that I am able to detern1ine whether or not a particular bullet 
was fired from a particular gun. 
Q. Do you recall some time this year that Lieutenant Bing-
ham or Trooper Haden brought you some bullets and a 
gunY 
A. I do. 
Q. Can you identify this as the gun-I believe they are 
your initials on those little capsules, aren't they (gives wit-
ness boxes with bullets in then1). 
A. That is right. (\Vitness examines gun and 
page 37 ~ the boxes containing bullets.) These are two 
bullets and a Smith and Weston revolver that I 
received from Trooper !-laden in the F. B. I. Laboratory for 
examination. 
Q. What conclusion did you reach with reference to this 
weapon and these two bullets 1 
A. As I said, I received one bullet I marked "Q-13, and th~ 
second bullet I marked "Q-14". In my comparison of test 
bullets that I fired from tl1is revolver and the bullet which 
I have in my band, I was able to identify this bullet as hav-
ing.been fired fron1 the suhn1ittecl revolved. I also compared 
the bullet which I have in my hand and n1arked "Q-13 17• 
The bullet itself did not contain sufficient markings on its 
surface for me to arrive at a conclusion regarding it. 
Q. In other words, it ·was so n1utilated before you received 
it that an examination woulcln 't reveal anything-? 
A. There were no scratches on it tl1at would permit me to 
identify the weapon from which it was fired. 
CROSS EX.A.JHINATION~ 
By ~{r. Joyce : 
Q. Mr. Berley, were both of these bullets, "Q-13H and 
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A. They were. 
page 38 ~ Q. And one of them didn't have enough mark-
ings on it so that you could determine whether or 
i not it was fired from this gun. Is that right? 
1 • A. That is correct. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, as a matter of fact isn't it true that when 
a gun bas been fired for quite son1e time that these little 
nicks and scratches in the barrel become worn so that they 
no longer make 111arkings ? 
A. I haven't found any that would no longer make mark-
ings, no, sir. 
Q. I believe you clailn to be an expert on firearms. Just 
what experience have you had with it~ 
A. I received a B. S. degree from Fordham University. I 
entered the F. B. I. Laboratory in 1942. I studied firearms 
exan1ination under other exan1iners for a six-month period. 
Since that tin1e I have examined probably one thdusand 
cases of 1ny own, including Inany, many thousands-
Q. With that experience, can you tell me whether or not 
that the smnc tool is used to bore the barrels of hundreds of 
revolvers of the san1e kind, put out by the same concern? 
A. The same tool is used. 
Q. Those tools wear out, do they not Y 
A. That is right. They do. . 
Q. And they will take another tool exactly ·like that. and 
continue the 1nanufactnre of the same type of re-
page 39 ~ volver 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. \\There you take another tool of exactly the same type 
and start out, don't you get exactly the same type of mark-
ings and nicks in the barrels? 
A. The san1e type ·of 1narkings have never been found. I 
perforn1ed tests in the F. B. I. Laboratories in which two 
gun barrels were made., one after the other, in which the 
same tool was used. I fired tests out of those, one after the 
other, and was able to identify the test bullet with the par-
ticular weapon with which it w·as fired. 
Q. Yon have testified to two bullets . there, one of which 
· you say has markings that are peculiar to the particular gun 
in question, and that the other does not. Is it possible that 
both of those bullets were fired by the same gun? 
A. It is possible. 
Q. They are bullets of the same caliber? 
A. That is correct, they are. 
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Q. ·If that is true, why is it there are markings on one 
and .not on the other T 
A. 'Both bullets possibly could have hit different sub-
stances; consequently, the markings at the beginning were 
present on the surfaces of both bullets when they left the 
gun barrel. However, the one bullet I have marked "Q-13" 
may have hit some substance which eradicated the mark-
. ings. . 
page 40 ~ Q. If that is true, is it not likewise h'ue that bv 
striking another substance, that that substance 
will eradicate or change the markings on a bullet and make 
the· markings entirely different than they were T 
· A. Are you referring to '' Q-14 "1 
Q. Yes . 
. A. On this bullet, I find that the marking·s were exactly 
the same as they were on test bullets I fired from the ·same 
gun. 
Q. But as a general question, if the striking of a sub-
stance can erase or eradicate entirely the markings ·on a 
bullet, is it not likewise possible that the ·striking of another 
substance can chang·e the markings on a substance so that 
they will be different T 
A. It may on some, but it did not occur on this specimen 
'' Q-14' '. 
Q. Isn't it also a fact that you so-called experts fre-
quently differ Y 
A. In the Laboratory, we have made thousandg of examina-
tions. We have what we call a "one-man system". We 
know from experience that two men having the same back-
ground and the same experience in firearms identification 
will arrive at the same conclusion. 
Q. Were you present at a trial recently held over in Abing-
don, Virginia·,-
:Mr. Whitehc~d: 'V e object to that. 
page 41 ~ Judge Whittle: I don't see that it has any-
thing to do with it. 
Q. You have admitted. it is possible for a bullet to strike 
a substance and entirely erase the markings on it. I want. 
you now to tell the Jury if it isn't also possible for you to 
make a mistake of your identification of a bullet? 
A. In my knowledge, I have never made a mistake in fire-
arms identification. 
Q. In other words, you are an expert that is infallible Y 
A. I wouldn't say I am infallible. 
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Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, having been 
first duly sworn, testified: 
. DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
Q. I believe you are 1\IIr. R. J. Berte? 
A. Yes, sir, I am. 
Q. What do you do, Mr. Berte1 . 
A. I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, presently assigned to the F. B. I. Laboratories 
in Washington, D. C. 
Q. What kind of work do you do 7 
A. I work in the Laboratory in the physics and chemical 
section; particularly, I do examinations of glass, paints· 
. . . . . . to compare them 'vith known anO, questioned samples 
that may be submitted. . 
page 42} Q. Can you give us some idea of y9ur educa-
tion~ 
A. I attended Bradley College at Peoria, Illinois, and I 
graduated in . . . . \vith a B. S. And I studied physics and 
ehemistry, and then worked for the du Pont Company and 
for the Department of Agriculture for approximately three 
years. Following that, I went to the F. B. I. Laboratory 
where I have been for three years. 
Q. Mr. Berte, did you have occasion to make an examina-
tion with reference to a safe and an auto lid brought to you 
by Trooper Haden or Trooper Bing·ham! 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. "\Vhen was thatT . 
A. I believe that was-I don't 'recall the exact date. I 
scratched the date on the lid (leaves stand and examines 
ear lid). 4-2-48. 
Q. April 2, 1948 7 · 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And these are the tM> articles brought to your labora-
tory? 
A. Yes, sir, I assisted Trooper Haden in removing them 
from his car. 
Q. And you made a comparison of the metals and the 
paints? . . 
A. We looked at the car trunk lid with the object of find-
ing, if possible,, anything that might have been attached to 
the safe; and a careful examination of the insulation or the. 
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· fiber material ,about the center of the curved lid, 
page 43 ~ I found some paint particles imbedded deeply into 
the fiber insulation, and I took also specimens of 
the paint from various places on the safe, and I first made a 
microscopic examination of these paint particles, and I found 
that the small particles I obtained from the ·lid had three 
layers of paint. It was an olive drab color over a reel primer 
paint, and that was over a black layer. The paint from the 
safe I examined the same way. I found the sarne paint struc-
ture, the same sequence, olive drab over red, over black. Fol-
lowing that I made paint tests whkh showed that the speci-
mens were neither a lacquer paint or a synthetic enamel. 
They were, an ordinary enamel. Following that, I made an 
examination to determine the metallic con1position, and tl1at 
is done by means of a spectroscope, which is an optical in-
strument. By that, we can determine the leads present, like 
lead titaniun1, calcium, or whatever the substance n1ay be; 
and I found out-this examination is made by burning in a 
small graphite electrode a chip of each san1ple, and the light 
from that burning passes through a lens, and passes throug·h 
a slit, and fo~m., and it goes throug·h a prism wh<?re the light 
of the burning is broken down; and because each element 
present in that substance gives off a different wave length 
of light, the prism breaks it down where it can be observed 
in detail and studied, to determine what elements 
page 44 ~ are present. I can make a cornparison and there 
will be no doubt about the results. 
Q. What did your cmnparison show in tbisf 
A.. I found tbe metallic composition of these paint sub-
stances to be the same. 
Q. In other words, if the safe \Vas carried in the back part 
of the car, against the lid, the paint particles off the safe 
would wear into the lid-
Mr. Joyce: I think he is assum-ing that would be true and 
asking a leading question. 
Judge '\Vhittle: I don't think that is a leading question. 
A. Yes, sir. I concluded f:r;om my examination that the 
paint particles which I found in the insulation on the caF' 
trunk lid and the paint from the safe could have originated· 
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CROSS EXAl\IINATION. 
By Mr. Goode: 
Q. Mr. Berte, now in regard to paint that you are talking 
about there, having all the ele1uents. ...t\.ll paints are made 
by· a standard forn1ula put out by the Federal Government?· 
A. No, sir, there may be a specified paint fo'r boat. or for 
deck and various paints, but ordinary Sherwin Williams 
and ...... have their own specifications or their own forn1ula. 
Q .• And it is not a formula that is put out that 
page 45 ~ they bave to use the sa1ue ingredients in this par-
ticular kind of paint? · 
A. I have exan1ined Inany, n1any thousands of paint speci-
mens. I have found many white paints to· be similar com-
position but sufficient differences to detect differences. 
Q. If they had a particular shade in a reel or green, don't 
all companies use the same formula ·in n1aking that par-
ticular shade 1 
A. Not necessarily. I have found se-veral different red 
shades in the same chemical. I have found often at least 
four or five different chemicals. · 
Q. Did you test the san1e make and model and design auto-
mobile from anotber lid to see if the paint on that particular 
model and car was the san1e ns on this one Y 
A. I didn't find the paint that was anywhere near the car. 
·It was in1bedded in the fibrous material. 
Q. Did you exan1ine the paint on the lid to see if it was 
the satne type and desig11 ~ 
A. No, I assume it would be. 
Q. Now who brought this safe to you 1 
A. Trooper lladen. 
Q. "\Vhat kind of car was it in? 
A. Ford I belit='ve. I am not certain. 
page 46 ~ Q. "\Vhere did he bring it in tl1at particular car? 
A. lie had it loaded in his trunk of his car. 
Q. And was all of this n1ud on the safe wpen it arrived 
at Washington 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What particular part of this. safe here did you detect 
now that this fiber fron1 the rear end of the car was on the 
safe? 
A.. I took several san1ples. If you wish, I can locate the 
places. 
· Q. Could you point that out to me, any particular spot 
on this safe that you foun(~ the fiber-do you recall Y 
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A. No, sir, I didn't find fiber. 
Q. On this particular safe? 
A. Similar to that on his car., you mean? . 
Q. Well the two were not. in the same place ill; the car-
what did you find from the- · 
A. I found paint similar to that on the lid on the safe .. 
Q. Where did you find it on the safe--didn't you locate 
whether it was on the corner, or the rim 7 · 
A. As I said before, I took specimens from the safe and 
they had the same layer, structure and composition as the 
paint I removed from the fibrous material. . 
page 47 ~ Q. Now you say that several places on this safe, 
you found fiber? 
A. No, sir. . . 
Q. What was it you said Y9U found several places Y 
A.· I took specimens seve1~al places on the safe and com-
pared that with the paint. I found in this fibrous -material: 
Q. What places on the safe¥ 
A. Do you want me to point them out Y 
Q. That is right. 
A. (Witness left witness stand and went to safe). I -took 
specimens right here (indicating on safe). 
Q. That is on the right-hand side from the front. Where 
is another place 7 
A. I took specimens on the top. Specimens on the top 
from up in front. 
Q. On the rig·ht side and on the top. Now what other 
places? 
A. He.re is a pl.ace. 
Q. Now the mud didn't interfere with that at allY 
A. No, sir, I washed the paints which I removed from the 
safe, free of mud. 
Q. Was there any mud mixed with the paint at the time you 
tqok it off.? 
A. Yes. 
page 48 ~ Q. You wasl1ed the mud off; and then you got 
· to the paint. No·w, that is three places, on the 
right, on the left and on the top? 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Now would you find the same kind of paint on any 
safe of that same make and model? 
A. I do not think ·so, because I have examined also many 
safe paints; and we have specimens of safe paint from the 
majority of the paint manufacturers, and I have never seen 
any with a red primer. 
~ . 
I 
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Q. What make safe is that 7 . 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What color paint did you list as being on this safe 7 
A. Olive drab green. . 
Q. And you have ·been with the F. B. I. how long? 
A. Three years. 
Q. Now I want to get one other thing straight. The paint 
is what you detected on three sides and in the fiber? 
A. That is rig·ht. 
·Q. It was the paint-only the paint? 
A. That is right. 
page 49 ~ RE-DIR-ECT EXAMINATION. 
By 1vir. Thompson: 
Q. Mr. Berte, just to get the thing straight, you took this 
safe into the laboratory and took three specimens of paint 
off the safe, and then compared that with what you found in 
the fiber n1aterial on the lid t 
A. That is right. 
Q. It wasn't the reverse. Isn't it rather unusual that the 
sample specimens compare completely in layer, structure and 
composition Y 
A. It is very, very remote that we would find a specimen 
from one object meeting all the points of similarity whieh 
I have described, in another object,, that they .could haV'e 
originated from ·widely different sources. Very, very re-
mote. 
JOE IRVIN GILBERT (colored), 
the next witness, having been first duly sworn, tes~ified: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Whitehead: 
Q. Your name is Joe Irvin Gilbert Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the son of Ernest Gilbert Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you at home several months ago when Lieutenant 
Bing·bam brought this safe down to your house? 
A. Yes. 
Q .. Did you identify this as Ernest Gilbert's safe Y 
page 50 } Yes. He asked me to come out there and see if it 
was his safe; and I said, "It looked like it". And 
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I said, ''I ·have a key to the lock box'', and I went and got 
it and opened it .. 
Q. That key opened the inside boxY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is the safe t 
A. Ye~, sir. 
No cross examination. 
Trooper W- ·:F. Haden "ras cailed to the stand as a wit-
ness, but was stood aside without testifying until after the 
adjournment for lunch. 
Mr. Thompson : If it is all right with Your Honor, they 
(Counsel for defendant) have agreed to it, and I 'vill tell 
the Agents they are excused. · 
Judge Whittle: That is all right, sir. 
Judge Whittle: Any motion that this Jury be separated t 
Mr. Joyce: No, sir. 
Court was thereupon adjourned until 1 :30 P. 1\L for lunch.. 
TROOPER W. F. HA.DEN, 
the next witness, called when Court was reconvened, after 
having been first duly s'vorn, testified: 
page 51 r DIRECT EXAM~NATION .. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
· Q. I believe you are Trooper W. F. Hadenf 
A. That is right. 
Q. And a member of the Virginia State Police¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Haden, did ·you have occasion to deliver this car 
back and this safe to the F. B. I. Laboratories some time 
this year? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did you take those articles to Washing-ton OZ 
A. I took the safe in the back end of 1ny car in the ''turtle · 
shell'', and I carried the lid in the back seat of my car, with 
the back end-the safe was wrapped in cardboard so no metal 
would touch it. 
Q~ That is, so the back of your car would not make any 
markings on it~ 
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A. That is right. 
Q. In other words, it was completely cased in cardboard? 
.A. That is right. 
CROSS EXA!tiiNATION. 
By lVIr. Goode : 
Q. Where did you get this safe and the car lid Y 
A. I got that safe out of the ground about a mile above 
Ferrum, and it was in my possession until it was 
page 52 ~ delivered to the Departn1ent of Justice. 
· Q. And never did bring it here to the jail7 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. You never brought it here to the Courthouse? 
A. If it was here, it was in my automobile; it wasn't taken 
out. That deck lid was taken from Lieutenant Bingham's 
car and put in mine. 
Q. You got this lid from Lieutenant Bingham y. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·vvhere was this safe turned over to you Y 
A. It was turned over to me when it was rolled out of the 
ground, until it was delivered to Washington. 
Q. After that, where was it? 
A. Right in that roon1 (indicating). 
Q. "There did Lieutenant Bingham give you the lid 7 
A. A. t the back end of 111y car. 
Q. Did you then in1meclia tely proceed to vV ashington with 
that particular safe and lid f 
A. I did. 
Q. On that day? 
A. I think it was the following <lay. 
Q. Did you wrap thisf 
A. I put it in the back of my car. 'vith the bottom up,. so 
nothing would come in contact with it. 
page 53 r Q. What kind of car do you have Y 
A. A light gray 1947 Ford Coach. 
Q. Did you have a trunk in the back of it Y 
A. It is a coach car. 
Q. And did you have any difficulty getting the safe in the 
back end~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. vVhat position was the safe lying in your carY 
A. Laying with its back down; the top up; the wheels out. 
Q. vVas it in the san1e positiou when you reached Washing-· 
ton as it was when you left Gretna f 
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A~ Yes, sir. 
Q. Hadn't been moved. 
(No answer.) 
Mr. Thompson: We rest. 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor please, before we proceed with 
our case, I stood aside a witness or two with the privilege 
of recalling them, and I 'vant to recall them now. 
Judge Whittle: All right, sir. 
·MRS. OCIE WADE MENEFEE, 
recalled by Counsel for defendant for fur~her cross exami-
nation: · 
By Mr. Joyce: 
Q. Mrs. Menefee, when you were on the stand awhile ago, 
you testified that a pistol shown to you was in your home on 
t)le night of May 24, 1947. What was the serial number on 
. that pistol¥ 
page 54 r A. I don't kno,v. 
Q. What was the make of that pistol Y 
A. I don't know: I just recognized the gun . 
. Q. What was the caliber of that pistoU 
·A. I don't know . 
. Q. What identifying marks were on it? 
A. I don't know. · 
Q. You can't tell this Jury the make of the pistol or the 
caliber of it? 
A. I guess it is a thirty-eight. 
Q. You don't even know that? 
A. I don't know one gun from another.· 
Q. The only thing you know about this case is that there 
was a pistol there of a certain type, and that is not the only 
pearl-handled pistol you have ever seen 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that is the reason you say this pistol here was tha 
one that was there, because you have never seen but one 
pearl-handled pistol Y 
A. I know the pistol. 
Q. How do you lmow itY 
· A. It has been there long enough. 
Q. What is there about that pistol that causes 
page 55 r you to know it y 
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J es.sie . Gilbert (colored). 
Q. Other pistols have handles like that? 
A. They certainly do, but I know that he bought that. 
Q. Are you willing to swear to this Jury positively tha~ 
that is the pistol that was there at your homef 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Thompson: 
Q. Is this the pistol you gave Lieutenant Bingham f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long had he had it before May 24: Y 
A. I can't say, but he got it from Earl Smith. 
JESSIE GILBERT {colored), 
recalled by Counsel for defendant, for further cross axami· 
nation: 
By Mr. Joyce: 
Q. Aunt Jessie, when you were on the stand awhile ago, 
you told the Jury that two people came iJ;l your home, one a 
short one whom you identified as Elton Whitlow, and the other 
a tall one. I want you to look at Henry Menefee there and 
tell the Jury whether or not he was the tall man that came 
there? 
A. No, sir, he wasn't. 
Q. I believe you told the Jury awhile ago that you had 
known Henry Menefee before that night f 
A. Yes. 
page 56 } Q. Did you see Henry Menefee around your 
home that nightY . 
A. No. 
Q. Did you hear any voice that sounded like his Y 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Joyce: Now, if Your Honor please, before we present 
any testimony, I have a motion I wish to make out of the pres-
ence of the Jury. 
Judge Whittle, the attorneys both for the Commonwealth 
and the defendant, and the stenographer, went to the Judge's 
chamber where the following m.otion was made, in the jury's 
absence; 
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Jessie Gilbert (colored). 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor please, ·the motion that I desire 
to make is a motion to strike the evidence of the Common-
wealth on the ground that it is insufficient to show the guilt of 
the defendant beyo1id a reasonable doubt and, therefore, in-
sufficient to sustain a conviction if one \Yere had. I don't care 
to argue the motion. The Court has beard the evidence, and 
I simply want to make it, withol.1t argtunent. 
Mr. ThO!llPSOil.: vVe submit that there is ample evidence 
there to support a conviction, based on the ballistic evidence 
and the metallic comparison, and that t~1e question of whether 
or not those points. are worthy of belief is a question for the 
Jury to decide, as pointed out in Ferrell v. Co'111/lnonwealth,. 
177 Va. 
page 57 ~ Judge Whittle: I am going to overrule the 
motion. Let the record show that they except to 
the action. 
Mr. Joyce: Now, I desire to make a motion to strike all 
the evidence relative to the part of an automobile introduced 
here, and all evidence relative to the ownership of the auto-
mobile from whence that part can1e, on the ground and for 
the reason that it has never been shown that the car from 
which that part was taken \Vas used in this· robbery. The 
only evidence relative to how that the safe was· taken away 
from there, conws frmn Jessie Gilbert, the wife of the de-
ceased; and she frankly adn1its that she doesn't know whether 
it was an automobile or whether it 'vas a truck. All she knows 
is that some motor vellicle \Vas backed up there and the safe 
was loaded on it; and I submit, Sir, that this evidence is not 
connected in any way, so it has any bearing on .this case, ancl 
it ought to be stricken. . 
Judge Whittle: If any believe the F. B. I. Agent, the one 
in regard to the point expert, he places the. safe in this car; 
and it is a question for the Jury, and that motion will have 
to be overruled. 
~{r. Joyce: I \\rant to save the point as to the overruling 
of hoth motions by the ColJrt. 
page 58 ~ · Judge ''rhittle: All right. Gentlemen, anything 
furtherf 
Mr. Joyce : I don't know of anything else. Just to keep · 
the record straight, I also· n1ove the Court to strike from the 
record all of the testimony of Ocie Wade 1vienefee, the wife 
of the defendant, for grounds heretofore stated in the record. 
Judge Whittle: I sustained your 1notion in regard to all· 
communication between Mr. ~{enefee and his wife, but I over-
I 
) / 
Henry A. Menefee v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 65 
Ocie Wade Menefee. 
ruled your 1notion in regard ~o the evidence she gave as to 
what she saw. As I understand, that is all she testified to. 
1\Ir. Joyce: The defendant excepts to the action of the 
Court in overruling a portion of the motion s~ated. 
The Court, attorneys for the Commonwealth and for the 
.J defendant, returned to the Courtroom where there was again 
a brief recess to permit Defense Counsel to confer with the 
Defendant and their witnesses, after which the .trial was re-
sumed. 
OCIE vV ADE MENEFEE, 
again recalled at the request of counsel for defendant for 
further examination: 
By 1\Ir. Joyce: 
Q. l\frs. l\Ienefee, before noon when you were on the stand, 
you testified as to the whereabout of your husband succeeding 
the 24th of l\fay, 1947, and on cross examination I asked you 
if it 'vere not a fact that you had gone on a bond for a man 
by the name of Roy Jones, and if your husband 
page 59 ~ hadn't gone to Ohio in that connection. Now that 
you have had an opportunity to think it over, I 
want to ask you if you didn't go on the bond of Roy Jones 
on the 4th of Nove1nber, 1946? 
A. I still say I don't remember, but I went' on my husband's 
bond. 
Q. I "rill ask you again if YOJI weren't on the bond of Roy 
Jones7 
A~ I cannot 1~emember. 
Q. I will ask you if you didn't go on Roy Jones' bond again 
on the 15th of December, 1946? 
A. I don't remember. I am sorry. 
J\IIr. Joyce: Now, if Your Honor please, we had agreed 
with the gentlemen-we had expected to have the Trial Justice 
of Franklin County here with the records, but to save the 
trouble of his con1ing, we have agreed with the gentlemen 
of the prosecution that if he were here, he would have with him 
the original of the warrant in that Rqy Jones case, and by 
llim that we would show .that this 'vituess·, ~frs. J\tiencfee, 
went on the bond of R.oy Jones on November 4, 1946, and 
again on December 15, 1946, and that this statement may be 
considered in evidence as evidence of the Trial Justice, and 
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that that record may be considered to be before the 
page 60} Jury, showing that she did go on the bond on those 
two occasions. 
Mr. Thompson: She didn't deny it. 
Judge Whittle: She said she didn't ;remember it. 
Mr. Joyce: Now, we desire to say that we are through 
for the defense. 
erudge Whittl~: All right. Come in here. 
Judge Whittle, the Attorneys for the Commonwealth and 
for the Defendant retired to the Judge's Chamber for a dis-
cussion of proposed instructions, after ·which they returned 
to the Cou~troom and the trial Wfl.S resumed. 
The instructions of the Court were given to the ,Jury, 
arguments of Counsel for the Commonwealth and for the De-
fendant were heard, after which the Jury retired to conside_r 
it~ verdict. Some time thereafter, the .Jury returned to the 
Courtroom and reported its verdict finding the defendant 
~ty and fixing his punishment at ten years in prison. 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor please, I desire to make a motion 
to set aside the verdict of the Jury on two grounds : First : 
The admission of improper testimony offered on b.ehalf of the 
Common"realth, to which the defendant objected; and, second: 
To. set aside the verdict on the ground that it is contrary to 
the law and the evidence. I do not care to argue my motion. 
Mr. Whitehead: If Your Honor please, we would 
page 61 } like to present sonie law on this question of ad-
missibility of evidence, 'because we have some law 
we want to present. 
Judge Whittle: I want to take the matter under advise-
ment for awhile. It is a right close question as to that woman 
testifying, and I want some opportunity to study it. Is this 
·man in jail Y 
Mr. Joyce: No, sir. He is under bond. What is the 
amount? 
Deputy Clerk: $7,500.00. 
Judge Whittle: What does the Commonwealth sayl I 
want to act on this matter" rather promptly and in view of 
that, I think we had better remand him to jail. 
Mr. Joyce: If Your Honor would consider a larger bond, 
I expect we could give it. 
~. 
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Judge Whittle: Perhaps so. I don't make it a practice 
io admit people to hail with that much sentence. Take charge 




Henry .A. Menefee. 
1. 
The court instructs the jury that the crime of robbery con-
:sists of the theft· of property from the person, or in the pres-
.ence, of the qwner accompanied by violence, or putting in 
fear, or the presentation of a deadly weapon, and is punish-
able by death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life 
()r for any term not le~s than eight years. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Henry A. Menefee. 
2. 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
~vidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, 
Henry A. Menefee, went to the home of Ernest Gilbert pur·· 
:suant to a previous design to rob the said Ernest Gilbert, and 
that the said 1\Ienefee was present to aid and abet in said 
crime and witnessed said robbery by violence and thereafter 
aided other persons in tra:psporting, concealing and disposing 
of the stolen property; then the said Henry A. Menefee is 
guilty of robbery by violence although he did not person-
ally take the safe from Ernest Gilbert or threaten or shoot 
· the said Gilbert. 
page 63} a. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Henry ,A. Menefee. 
The court instructs the jury as a matter of l~w that in con-
sidering the case the jury are not bound to go beyond the evi-
dence to hunt up doubts nor must they entertain such doubts 
as are merely chimerical or conjectural. A doubt to justify 
an acquittal must be reasonable and must arise from a candid 
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and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case,. 
arid unless it is such that were the same kind of doubt inter-
·posed in a graver transaction of life it would cause a reason-
able and prudent man to hesitate and pause it is insufficient to 
authorize a verdtpt of not guilty. If after considering all the 
evidence the jurj; can say they have an abiding conviction of 
the truth of t~e Charge, they are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt .. 
page 64 t 4 .. 
Commonwealth 
v .. 
IIenry A. Menefee .. 
The court instructs the jury that one charged with crime 
may be convicted on circumstantial evidence alone, if the jury 
believe beyond a ·reasonable doubt, from said circumstantial 
evidence, that the person so charged is guilty of the crime 
alleged against him. Therefore, the court instructs the jury in 
this case that they have the tight to convict the defendant 
upon circumstantial evidence alone, if the jury believe from 
the said circumstantial evidence the guilt of the defendant 
(has been established) beyond a reasonable doubt. And the 
court further instructs the jury that circumstancial evidence 
in criminal cases is not only competent evidence, but is some-
times the only mode of proof. 
page 65 t A .. 
The Court instructs the Jury that while circumstantial 
evidence is legal and c9mpetent in a criminal case, yet it 
should always be received and scanned by a jury with great 
caution. 
B. 
The Court instructs the jury that the question of identify 
as to the person who comn1itteed the robbery in question is 
one of grave consideration for them forming their verdicts, 
and before the defendant, Henry Menefee, can be convicted 
of the same the Commonwealth must prove that question 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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page 66 ~ c. 
· The Court instructs the jury that the failure of the evi-
dence to disclose any other criminal agent than the accused 
is not a circumstance which may be considered by the jury in 
determining whether the accused is guilty of the crime with 
which he is charged. The prisoner is presumed to be inno-
cent until his guilt is establishe.d beyond all reasonable doubt, 
and he is not to be prejudiced by the inability of the Com-
monwealth to point out any other criminal agent, nor is he 
called upon nor required to vindicate his innocence by nam-
ing· the guilty party. 
page 67 ~ D. 
The Court instructs the jury that· the defendant, Henry 
Menefee, comes to the bar presu1ned to be innocent, and this 
presumption of innocence goes with him through the entire 
trial and applies at every stage thereof. No burden rests 
upon him to prove his innocence, but before a conviction can 
be had his guilt must be shown beyond all reasonable doubt 
by clear, distinct and reliable evidence, and you are further 
, told in this ease· that no degTee of probability or suspicion 
merely, however strong or well-founded, will justify a con-
viction. If after having heard all of the evidence in the case, 
both for the Cominonwealth and the defendant, you were to 
believe his guilt probable only, or even more probable than 
his innocence, this will not justify you in convicting· him., but 
before a conviction can be bad the evidence against him .must 
be so strong and so convicing tJ1at you can say you are con~ 
vined of his g·uilt to a moral certainty. 
E. 
The Court instructs the jury that moral certainty is that 
full and complete assurance which admits of· no defense and 
induces a sound mind to act without doubt upon the· conclu-
e.ion to which it naturally and reasonably leads. · 
page 68 ~ Virg·inia : 
In the Circuit Court of Pitsylvania County. 
Commoinyealth of Virginia 
1.7. 
Henry A. Menefee 
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MEMORANDUM: OF OPINION. 
This case involves a prosecution for robbery by violence, 
a ~ommon law crime, the punishment for which is· prescrib~d 
by ·Section 4405, Virg·iriia Code. Ernest Gilbert, a Negro 
citizen of Pittsylvania County, was killed and his iron safe, 
allegedly containing a larg·e sum of money, was removed by 
the robbers. from his home and carried to a place in Franklin 
County where it was blown open and its contents removed. 
The defendant, Menefee, was indicted for robbery. by violence 
anQ. upon his trial, a verdict of guilty has been found by the 
jury, and his punishment fixed at ten years' confinement in · 
the penitentiary. . 
The matter is now before the. Court on a motion to set 
aside the verdict, on the gTounds that the s~me is contrary 
to the law and the evidence without evidence to support it, 
and upon the more serious ground that the Court pe1·mitted . 
the divorced wife of the accused to be called as a witness 
and allowed her to testify ag·ainst him, ,\rithout his consent. 
The. wife had been granted an absolute divorce 
page 69 } from the accused, and her testimony did not con-
. cern ''Privileged Communications'' as the term 
has been defined; she "ras not permitted to t~stify to any 
conv~n had with her husband concerning the robber_y, 
but she was permitted to testify ns to whaL.she~ and to 
facts that she knew of-her own· knowledge; all of which came 
to her knowledge while th~ marriage ~Ub§ls!,eiD and tbe facts 
testifi~d to by the wife were undouptedly gatned by virtue of 
the fa.ct that the parties were, ~t the time: living together .as 
man and wife. 
Counsel for the accused contend that the divorced wife is 
not ~"nbritness regarding matters learned lJY her 
agains . . while t.h_~ ll1arriage relationship e . d_and that 
this iSQUalifiCatiOn survives tl1e termination~ relation-. 
ship by death or as in this case.~ by absolute divorce. Coun-
sel for the Comn1onwealth contend that the basis of tbe rule 
that the wife is incompe_tent during- coverJ1ire is the policy 
of the law to protect the marital relationship but where this 
relationship has been severed, as by absolute divorce in this 
instance, that the reason for the rule no longer exists hence, 
where the reason fails the rule should fail. 
This case has been extensively and ably argued 
page .70 ~ by both sides and in addition, Counsel for the ac-
cused have submitted a twenty page brief of au-
thorities, for which the Co~rt expresses its appreciation. 
My own investigation of this question indicates that the 
Henry A. Menefee v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 71 
precise question here presented has never been decided in 
Virginia by our Supreme Court. 
The reasons for the rule dealing with the question of in-
competence during coverture, handed down to us from the 
. Common La,v, is well and strongly stated in Stein. v. Boto-
1nan, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 209, Davis v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 838, 
etc., as follows: 
''This rule is founded upon the dee~est and soundest prin-
ciples of our nature, principles which have grown out of those 
domestic relations that constitute the basis of civil society, 
and which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence 
which should subsist between those who are connected by 
the nearest and dearest relations of life.. To break down or 
impair the g-reat principles which protect the S..anctities of v 
husband and wife, would be to destroy fhe best solace of 
human existence.'' · 
This statement was the '' r~'' for the common law rule, 
and it is the "reason" behind Statutes which have heen 
passed in some of our states to protect the rule. But what 
happens to the rule, when the reason for it has been done 
away with by an absolute. ·divorce decree 1 The reason hav-
ing failed, does the rule fail? 
page 71 ~ It is not contended that ~1rs. Menefee would not 
be a coillpetent witness as to matters happening 
since the divorce became final. Therefore, it was not error 
to permit her to be ''called'' as .a witness-she was not his 
'vife in contemplation of the statute where she was called. 
The. error., if any, was committed when the Court permitted 
her to testify to facts which came to her knowledge concew-( v 
ing this robbery, during coverture and possibly on _account 
Qf the ma:IT!age relationship. · 
The case of Oliver's Ad1n. v. Hayes' Adm., 1 Virginia De-
cision 180 (1877), is cited by the defendant as controlling. 
This is a civil case in \vhich. the widow was held incompetent 
as a witJiess concerning the execution of a bond during the 
lifetime of her husband. There are so many similar civil 
cases. She revisors notes to Section 6210 of the Code of 
1919. That these cases no longer are binding is attested by 
Thomas v. First }.[a,tional Bank, 166 Va. 497, 186 S. E. 77 
(1936), where the widow ·was held a competent witness. 
The three Code Sections involved, 6210, 6211 and 6212, do 
not in express terms deal with this situation. 'Section 6211 
treats the subject only so long as the parties are husband and 
wife. Section 6212, which is particularly here involved, 
saves confidential communications from disclosure af~er the 
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relationship has ceased. This is the only mention 
page· 72 ~ of a rule of evidence after the marriage has efi4e€l. 
The na~ral corollary is that if a statute w~t~ 
necessary to ~e confidential communications then nothing 
else is banned from disclosure hence all other evidence after 
the relationship h~sed is admiss·I··ble. T.he argument is 
made that Se~tiot Q2l2.. s restrictec!JQ __ civil c.ases, but I find 
no such limitation~ . en in the statu~ . --- . 
Without a controlling precedent in Virginia we naturally 
turn to what has happened elsewhere. In 70 Corpus .Juris, 
at Page 125, this is found: · 
''Although there is a conflict of opinion, the weight of au-
thority as weU as reason, favor the view that an alJsolute 
divorce places the former spouses in the same position in 
respect to competency as witnesses as thol.}gh there had been 
no marriage and that each n1ay testify for or ag:a.i.nst th~ 
other, even as to matters which occurred or came to his or 
her kn wledo·e durino· the existence of the marriage relation~ 
unless such ma ters are in the nature of confidential com-
munication.'' 
A similar statement is found in 28 Ruling Case Law, at 
Page 489: 
~
"While it is ui1doubtedlv true that divorce does not render 
one spouse competent to testify against the other with r~g_ard 
to confidential communications passing between them iC'is 
equally certain _that a div.orced spouse is a con1petent. wit-
ness against the other as to all other matters.'' 
Perhaps the outstanding authority on the law of evidence 
in the United States today is the 1nonograph of the late Pro-
fessor Wigmore. In his latest edition this is said: 
-...;:::;,__ . 
page 73 ~ "Testin1ony against spouse deceased or di-
vorced. Can there be dissension with the ''manes' 
of a departed 1 Is .there for married pairs a posthumous 
peace., capable of fracture by service of subpoena upon the 
survivor, and therefore fit to be forefended by the law? If 
so, then the privilege should extend a 'post mortem' protec-:-
tion. But unless 've assume such a theory, the privilege 
ceases upon the death of a spouse. It is true that, among 
the varying reasons for the privilege, one of them· does sug-
gest a rational extension beyond the life of th~ parties, 
namely, that policy of fairness which aims to exempt husband 
and wife from the repug·nancy of being the 1neans of con..: 
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demning the other (Ante, §2228, P. 15); for this repugnance 
must exist also; in some degree, to a condemnation of the 
memory of the departed one. But (apart from the argu-
ment that this reason.has by no means been a generally ac-
cepted one) the answer is that a detriment of such exiguous 
delicacy could not with propriety he allowed to stand in the. 
way .of the judicial establishment of truth. 1\foreover, look-
ing back at the principl(l which dP.fines testimony 'againt};'' 
a spouse as testimony agaiilst a spouRe who is a party to e 
cause (Ante, §2234), it is obvious that, since a deceased per-
son cannot be a party, testimony concerning the deceased 
person can never be said to be te8timony 'against' a spouse.'' 
. "And Fhat is to be sai~ of a divorced spouse Y Does the 
privilege there also continue Y After the grave cause for 
dissolution-adultery, desertion, crime, or the like--has come 
to pass., and the parties have been not only alienated in spirit, 
but also solemnly freed, by judicial decree, from the obliga-
tions of mutual concord and concession, is there any longer 
either in fact or in policy, a marital peace which must be kept 
inviolable 1 Or is the legal fiction so elastic and so artificial 
that it can afford to dispense with even a modicum of fact 
fo·r its support, and can be deemed to exist even after the 
bonds of matrimony have been loosed? There ought' to· be 
no doubt that this would be carrying too far the fantasies 
of legal pretense.'' 
page 7 4 ~ ''So, too, aftet._d.~ there is no privilege t.o 
withhold the testimony of either; although in a 
few courts the san1e ·confn~ion· bas here also appeared be-
tween the present privilege and the privilege for confidential 
communications.'' 
I am aware of what l\fr~ ,JuRtice Spratley had to say in 
Meade v. Comrnonwealth, 186 Va., p. 784, that: 
''Professor \Vigmore in his excellent work on evidence, 
3rd. Ed., Vol. VIII, page 2:21, et seq., vigorously attacks the 
privileges granted by the common law rule and the reasons 
upon which the rule is based. ·we are not, however, called 
Upon to pass upon the refiRons for the rule, or the wisdom 
of the law. A lack of good reason may be grour1d for the 
legislature to change the law; but we must construe the law 
as it is." 
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The Meade case does not consider the point here involved 
but is a cor~ect construction of Code Section.~ with refer- · · 
ence to what is a criminal offence committed by one spouse 
against the other. Professor Wigmore's reasoning would 
hardly apply in the J\feade case where- the construction 'of 
this statute was involved, but in our opinion it very strongly 
applies in the instant case and it apparently recites the ma-
jority rule in this country. However there are text authori-
ties to the contrary. See ,Jones on Evidence, 4th Edition, . 
1330, Sec .. 736; Underhill on Evidence, 4th Edition, p. 668, 
Sec. 347, and Wharton's Criminal Evidence, lOth Edition 
816, Sec. 39'9. None of these authors discuss the matter as 
elaborately and as thoroughly as Professor Wig-
page 75 ~ more. 
. . One has to only read and see what is happening 
In this country to the sacred and solemn thing· called mar-
riage-Where the sovereign stales of the nation are bidding 
against each other for the di.yorce ~arket and even our own 
Com!Donwealth is relaxing its rules dealing with the subject 
of d1vorce. In the face of this should we adhere to rules, 
wi1J!opt -+~son, which will permit a person guilty of a hor-
rible crime to_gQ ~pwhipped of justice? A great builder of/'r J 
the common law: said, in suhstance : ''The reason of the law ~ ~ 
_/?' is the life of -the law;_ when the reason ceases, the law lfe-
r / comes of no avail''. 
In the final analysis I cannot escape the conclusion that a 
rule of law, not based upon statute or reason, should continue 
to exist. The reasons behind the common law rule are not 
here present. I do not feel that it is a Court's duty to per-
petuate a rule, the very foundation of which has been lost. 
See Harriot v. Sherwood, 82 ya. 1-15; Funk v. Un-ited States, 
290 U. S. 371; 93 A. L. R.. 1136 ( 1933). 
Admittedly, the question here raiRed is a close one in our 
jurisdiction., but as heretofore stated, the point has never 
been decided by Olir Appellate Court. I am of the 
page 76 r opinion the evidence was adnlissible under the cir-
cumstances in the case. If I decide otherwise, the 
error, if any, would become irr~medial for the Cormnon-
wealth because the Comn1onwealt.h has no futher recourse 
and this is not so for the accused, who in the face of the evi-
dence is guilty, in my opinion, beyond a reasonable dou'bt. 
He has able counsel and sufficient recourses to protect his 
interests on appeal. . 
The other grounds assigned for the verdict to be set 'as1de 
have not been arg'lled or stressed and with the evidence of 
the divorced wife in tho record, the exceptions are withou.~tb j 
''~~- ~ ~ 4._ .,,.;,..__ ~,,. 4-4 r;L_. ~~ ~~ -:'j;f ~ ~ L~ 1 l~t~~ : f( ,~ w£~J- c--.~ 
1/ ~ ?' r ~, {Vrii<J A .. L~.:i;;;: ) 
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merit. See Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 861, 14 S. E. 
(2nd) 293 (1941). 
For the reasons herein expressed the motion to set aside 
the verdict will be overruled. . 
December 14 ~h, 1948. 
KENNON C. WHITTLE 
·Judge 
page 77 } I, Kennon C. "'\Vhittle, Judge of the ·circuit 
Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, do here-
by certify that due notice, as required by law, was ·given to 
the Attorney for the Commonwealth of the presentation and 
sig·ning of the foregoing· certificate, and do further certify 
that the foreg·oing is all of the evidence and happenings on 
the trial, as therein set forth, and all of the instructions re-
quested by both the Commonwealth and the defendant, and 
the action thereon, and I, having seen, examined and in-
spected the fqregoing certificate and having found same to 
be correct, the same are now made a part of the record in 
this cause. 
This 11th day of February, 1949. 
KENNON C. WHITTLE, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Pittsyl-
vania County, Virginia 
page 78} I, E. E. Friend, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Pittsylvania County, Virginia, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of so much of the 
record and judicial proceedings of said Court as I have been 
directed to copy in a certain criminal case of Commonwealth 
<>f Virginia against Henry A. ~fenefee. 
And I further certify that the defendant has filed with me 
a written notice of the Commonwealth of Virginia of his in-
tention to apply for a transcript of said record, which notice 
shows on its face to have been duly accepted by W. Carrington 
Thompson, Attorney for the Commonwealth of Virginia, in 
and for the County of Pittsylvania. . 
. Given under my hand this 14th day of February, 1949. 
E. E .. FRIEND, 
Clerk of the Circ:uit Court of Pittsyl-
vania County, Virginia. 
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I; E. E. Friend, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 
County~ Virginia, do certify that the foregoing copy of the 
evidence adduced,. and other incidents of the trial of the case 
of Commonwealth of ·Virginia against Henry A. 1\ienefee, 
with the Court's rulings on matters presented to him and the 
objections and exceptions thereto, all of which have been 
duly authenticated by the Judge of said Court, were lodged 
and filed with me as Clerk of said Court on the 14th day of 
February, 1949. 
E. E. FRIEND, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Pittsyl-
. vania County, Virginia. 
A ·copy-Teste·: 
M .. B. vVATTS~ C. C .. 
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RULE 1~-BRIEFS 
1. Form and contents of appellant's bri~f. The opening brief of the appellant (or 
the petit1on for appeal when adopted as ~a1e opcnmg bnef) shall contam: 
(a) A subject index and table of cit~ tions w1th ca~es alphabetically arranged. 
Citations of V1rgima cases must refer to t ~e Virgmia Reports and, m addition, may 
reier to otlicr reports conta1rung such cas . 
(b) A brief statement of the material roceedings m the lower court, the errors 
assigned, and the questions involved in the appeal. 
(c) A clear and concise statcl11cn t of the facts, with refcreJ1ces to the pages of 
the record where there is any possibility that the other side may question the state-
ment. \\'here the facts are controverted it should be so stated. 
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellant. 
The brid shall be signed by at least one attorney practicing in this court, giving his address. 
The appellant may adopt the petition :ior appeal as his opening- brief by so stating 
in tl1e petition, or by giving lo opposing counsel written notice of such in ten lion 
within five days of the receipt by appellant of the printed record, and by filing ;; 
copy of such notice with the clerk of the court. :t\o alleged error not specified in the 
opening brief or petition for appeal shall be admitted as a ground for argl1ment by 
appellant on the hearing of the cause. 
2. Form and contents of appellee's brief. The brief for the appellee shall contain: 
(a) A subject index and table of citations with cases alphabetically arranged. 
Citations of Virginia cases mu~t rder lo the Virginia Reports and, in addition, 111ay 
refer to otlH~r rqwrts containing such cases. 
(h) A statement of the case and of the points involved, if the appellee disagrees 
with the statement of appellant. 
(c) A ~tateq1cnt of the facts which are necessary to correct or amplify the state.-
mexlt in appC:llant's brief i.n so far as it i< deemed erroneous or inadequate, with ap-
propriate rderence to the pages of the record. 
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellee. 
The brief shall be signed by at least one attorney practicing in this court, giving his adtlt·ess. 
3. Reply brief. The reply brief (if any) of the appellant shall contain all the au-
thorities relied 011 by him, not referred to in his petition or opening brief. In other 
respects it shall conform to the requirements for appellee's brief. 
4. Time of filing. (:.t) Ciz.>il cases. The opening b1·ief of the appC'l!ant (if there be 
one in addition to the petition for appeal) shall be filed in the clerk's oCJice within 
f1ftcen days after the receipt by counsel for appellant of the printed record, but in no 
event less than thirty days before the fir~t da)' of the session at wbich the case 
is to be h~arcl. The brief of the appellee shall be filed in the clerk's office not later 
than fihecn clays, and tbe reply brid of the appellant not later than one day before 
the first clav of the session at which the c.ase is to be heard. ' 
(b) Crimi11al Cases. In criminal cases briefs must be filt;d within the time specified 
in civil cases; provided, however, that in those cases in which the records ha,·e not 
been printed and deli,·cred to counsel at knst t\\'enty-live days before the beginnino-
of the next session of the court, such cases shall be placed at the foot of the docket 
for that session of the court, and the Cnmmonwealth's brief shall be filed at least ten 
rlav8 prior to the calling of the case, ~nd the reply brief for the plaintiff in error not 
lat.er than the day before the c;.se is callf"cl. 
(c) Stipulatio11 of counsel as t·o filing. Counsel for opposing parties may file with 
the clerk a written stipula~ion changing the time for filing briefs in any case; pro-
vided, ho\Ycver, that all bnds must be filed not later than the day before such case is to be l1ea1·d. 
5. Number of copies to be filed and delivered to opposing counsel. Twenty copies 
of t'ach brief shall be filed With the clerk of the cuurt, and at least two copies mailed 
or deliv<>red to opposing counsel on or before the rhy on which the brief is filed. 
6. Size and Type. P.riefs <hall be niuc inchef' in lci;gth and six inches in width so 
as to conform in dimensions to the prin•ed record. and ~hall be printed in tvpe not Jess 
in size, as to height and width, than the typr in Which the record is pr-inted. 'Ihe 
record number of the case and names of counsel shall be printed on the fmnt COYer of 
a11 b1·ick . 
7. Non-compliance, effect of. The clei'k of ~his court is dirfctt'd not' to receive or 
file a brief 1\'hich fails to comply with the requirements of thi~ rule. If neither side 
bas filed a proper brief the cause will not he l1eard. If nne of the parties fails to file 
a proper b1·id he r:annot he heard, _bt1L the case will be heard ecr j>a1'te upon the argti-
mcnt or the party by whom the lmcf has been filed. 

